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Abstract
Bosco, Frank Anthony. Ph.D. The University of Memphis. August, 2011. Ethical
Decisions about Sexual Harassment in Organizations: Automatic, Controlled, or Both?
Major Professor: Charles A. Pierce, Ph.D.
This dissertation describes three studies designed to evaluate the contributions of
automatic and controlled cognitive processes on observers’ decisions and behaviors
related to sexual harassment in organizations. Although management scholars have
proposed that decisions about sexual harassment may be guided by automatic cognitive
processes, evidence and implications related to this proposition are limited, and only
recently have theories capable of explaining such automatic influences emerged. In
Study one, 124 undergraduate students processed and made decisions about sexual
harassment scenarios while completing a secondary task used to infer cognitive effort
expenditure. I manipulated the moral intensity and issue typicality of the scenarios, and
assigned half the participants to expect the need to justify their decisions. Results
indicate that moral intensity of the sexual harassment scenario positively influenced
cognitive effort expenditure, but only for participants who expected to later justify their
decisions. In Study two, 140 undergraduate students participated in an experiment
designed to assess the extent to which moral intensity and issue typicality affect an
unobtrusive measure of ethical issue recognition. Results indicate that scenario
typicality, but not moral intensity, influences the extent to which the concept ethics
becomes activated when observers process unethical organizational behavior. Finally, in
Study three, 142 undergraduate students participated in a correlational study designed to
assess the relationships among implicit and explicit attitudes toward sexual harassment,
self-reported behavior, and on-line behavior. Results indicate that only implicit attitudes
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predict actual (on-line) behavior, whereas explicit attitudes predict only self-reported
behavior. Results from the three studies are interpreted in the context of managerial
ethical decision-making theory and have theoretical and managerial implications.
Regarding the former, evidence demonstrating the effects of automatic cognitive
processes on ethical decision making outcomes challenges a long-standing rational view
of business ethics. Regarding the latter, organizations stand to realize benefit by
considering alternative methods of employee ethics training, ethics training evaluation,
organizational culture communication, and a greater understanding of sexual harassment
phenomena.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
In the course of a day, a manager performs countless informational, interpersonal, and
decisional acts, ranging from the most minor and micro to the most major and macro in
scope. Paradoxically, micro-bias occurs in the form of split-second associations, outside
of awareness and ostensibly segregated from the macro-behaviors that lead to major
societal outcomes. The evidence, however, suggests that this segregation exists only as an
illusion in our minds, not in reality. Milliseconds matter. (Chugh, 2004, p. 219)
The topic of ethical decision making (EDM) receives increasing attention in the
field of management each year. This should come as no surprise, as unethical decisions
and behavior are associated with a variety of undesirable management-related
phenomena. Familiar examples include illegal discrimination in human resources
functions (e.g., Uhlmann & Cohen, 2007), executive financial misconduct (e.g., Hess,
2007), and sexual harassment (e.g., Martell & Sullivan, 1994a; Martell & Sullivan,
1994b; Pierce, Broberg, McClure, & Aguinis, 2004). As the opening quote by Chugh
(2004) reveals, the central and crucial role of the manager (cf. Mintzberg, 1973), by its
nature, comes with decisions that have wide-ranging consequences for organizations and
society at large. This concern is compounded by the possibility that managers may be
unaware of the cognitive processes through which they reach decisions. Indeed, a great
deal of managerial conduct may be preceded by unconscious cognitive processes (e.g.,
motives, drives, associations). Recent evidence reveals that this may especially be the
case for decisions regarding ethical issues (Marquardt, 2010; Marquardt & Hoeger, 2009;
Reynolds, Leavitt, & DeCelles, 2010).
Management scholars have set forth a variety of theoretical views on EDM, each
of which provides central propositions regarding the cognitive nature of the EDM
process. Early models (Jones, 1991; Rest, 1986) characterized the process as relying on
1

controlled cognition, in that actors recruit cognitive effort (e.g., calculation of benefit vs.
harm), before reaching a decision. However, a survey of more recent models reveals a
relaxed controlled process assumption. Some accomplish this by stressing automatic
process governance (e.g., Haidt, 2001; Sonenshein, 2007), while others explicitly
consider the influence of distinct automatic (i.e., intuitive) and controlled (i.e., reflective)
processes, and the conditions under which each affects ethical decisions and their
proximal outcomes (e.g., Reynolds, 2006b). As Reynolds (2006b) noted, “These models
are not only the foundation for the growing body of empirical research on individual
ethical decision making but also serve as a wellspring for prescriptions to organizations”
(p. 737).
Tests of the controlled cognition account of EDM (for reviews, see Ford &
Richardson, 1994; Kish-Gephart, Harrison, & Treviño, 2010; Loe, Ferrell, & Mansﬁeld,
2000; O'Fallon & Butterfield, 2005) are numerous, but have recently received a great deal
of criticism. Researchers have repeatedly made the call for an updated view of
managerial EDM, “What seems required, then, is a model of moral cognition that
articulates both the deliberative and automatic processes that underlie moral behavior”
(Lapsley & Hill, 2008, p. 315). As Trevino, Weaver, and Reynolds (2006) state,
“intuitionist models of moral judgment require substantial elaboration and testing” (p.
961). Despite comments like these, tests of the automatic (i.e., intuition-based) and
mixed-process accounts remain scant (for exceptions, see Marquardt & Hoeger, 2009;
Newitt, 2009; Reynolds et al., 2010), and a strong inference test (cf. Platt, 1964) of these
positions has gone largely uncompleted. Provided that the corpus of managerial EDM

2

research should be considered far from nascent (cf. Colquitt, 2008; Colquitt & ZapataPhelan, 2007), such a test is now crucial to our understanding of EDM processes.
Several authors have provided reasons for why an understanding of the cognitive
processes underlying EDM is essential, particularly with regard to the question of
whether the EDM process is best characterized as automatic (i.e., occurs outside of
cognitive awareness) or controlled. Such a distinction would have a major impact on our
understanding and prescriptions regarding ethics education, which has recently received
increased interest, as well as in our understanding of organizational culture, and how this
may play a role in fostering unethical behavior (Reynolds, 2006b; Sonenshein, 2007).
Indeed, Chugh (2004) noted that the distinction between automatic and controlled
processes could have a large impact on organization-relevant legal decisions. In short,
understanding EDM’s underlying cognitive mechanisms is critical for understanding the
elicitation of unethical behavior.
For management practitioners and scholars, understanding the cognitive processes
underlying decision-making has been essential, as understanding these processes is the
necessary first step to understanding the elicitation of the behavior in question, and thus,
its eventual prevention. This argument has been a central theme in research involving
automatic cognitive processes on staffing functions related to employee or applicant
ethnicity (e.g., Ziegert & Hanges, 2005), gender and physical attractiveness (e.g., Luxen
& van de Vijver, 2006; Nicklin & Roch, 2008), and team coordination and learning
processes in organizations (Rico, Sanchez-Manzanares, Gil, & Gibson, 2008), among
many others. Arguments for the application of such research findings generally emerge
in terms of educating decision makers of potential biases, and methods through which to
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overcome cognitive biases. In addition, cognitive biases underlying different types of
human resource management tools have been the subject of similar investigations. This
has been the case for methods of managerial ethics training (e.g., Perry, Kulik, &
Schmidtke, 1998; Weber, 2007), employee performance rating methods (Martell &
Evans, 2005), job analysis (Aguinis, Mazurkiewicz, & Heggestad, 2009), and many
others. Likewise, application arguments for research findings in these streams stress the
importance of bias awareness, and typically argue for either the preference of one method
over another, or for the education of human resources managers to become aware of, and
thus potentially reduce, their biases. To reiterate, in many cases, the applicability of
results suggests a path from understanding underlying cognitive processes to the
prevention of undesirable behavior, and this dissertation follows this tradition.
The primary purpose of this dissertation is to provide a test of existing EDM
models within the context of sexual harassment in organizations. I derive hypotheses
from existing theory in the field of management, and address the extent to which
automatic and controlled cognitive processes play a role in ethical decisions and
behaviors about sexual harassment. I approach this general research question from three
avenues to address three main questions.
Research Questions
Research Question 1. To what extent are ethical decisions about sexual
harassment in organizations accompanied by cognitive effort (e.g., effortful calculation of
magnitude of consequences) during exposure to the ethical issue? Jones’s (1991) issuecontingent model views the EDM process as relying exclusively on controlled cognition.
Regarding this question, according to Jones’s (1991) and Street, Douglas, Geiger, and
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Martinko’s (2001) EDM models, the moral intensity of a scenario should be positively
related to the level of cognitive effort expended during the EDM process. As such,
morally intense forms of sexual harassment in organizations (e.g., quid pro quo sexual
harassment; Pierce et al., 2004) should elicit greater levels of cognitive effort than those
of lower moral intensity (e.g., hostile environment sexual harassment; Pierce et al., 2004).
In contrast, Sonenshein’s (2007) and Reynolds’s (2006b) relatively automatic models of
managerial EDM would predict that cognitive effort allocated toward instances of sexual
harassment in organizations would be influenced not by moral intensity, but by either the
need to justify decisions (Sonenshein, 2007), or by the level of familiarity one has with
the issue itself (i.e., issue typicality; Reynolds, 2006b). I address this research question
using an online measure of cognitive effort expenditure during vignette exposure.
Research Question 2. Do individuals automatically recognize sexual harassment
in organizations as constituting an ethical issue without being asked? More recent
models of managerial EDM (e.g., Reynolds, 2006b; Sonenshein, 2007) provide that the
recognition stage of EDM, whether or not it actually represents a separable stage, is
automatic and uncontrollable. Thus, these theories suggest that individuals can come to
recognize that an instance of sexual harassment exists, for instance, through unconscious
cognitive processes such as pattern matching (Reynolds, 2006, 2006b). In contrast,
traditional EDM views (e.g., Jones, 1991) consider this stage as controlled, such that
individuals exert cognitive control during exposure to ethical issues, and arrive at a
conscious awareness that an ethical issue exists. This research question will be addressed
with a semantic priming technique that provides insight regarding which information was
activated in participants’ minds.
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Research Question 3. To what extent do automatic and controlled cognitive
processes predict on-line (i.e., in-vivo) and self-reported sexually harassing
organizational behavior? Traditional EDM views (e.g., Jones, 1991) would respond to
this question by asserting controlled process governance. Thus, because EDM is a
controlled process, controlled (i.e., conscious) cognitive processes should predict all
forms of ethical/unethical behavior. In contrast, more recent managerial EDM models
(e.g., Reynolds, 2006b; Sonenshein, 2007) provide avenues through which both
automatic and controlled cognitive processes influence behavior. In addition, a recent
theoretical perspective from the social-cognitive literature provides propositions
regarding the interaction of the two types of cognitive processes. This research question
is addressed by assessing implicit and explicit attitudes toward sexual harassment in
organizations, as well as self-reported and on-line sexually harassing behavior.
Each of these research questions is critical for understanding, and thus preventing,
sexual harassment in organizations. For instance, regarding the first research question,
the level of cognitive automaticity or control exerted during EDM will have a large
impact on recommendations for employees’ and managers’ ethical training. If the EDM
process is not exclusively controlled, then ethics training curricula may require
considerable revision. Indeed, psychologists have stressed that training must be tailored
to the underlying cognitive processes responsible for behavior, and that training
automatic moral processes can achieve meaningful results. As Seligman and Kahana
(2009) note, “Our conjecture strongly implies that intuition is teachable, perhaps
massively teachable” (p. 104).
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The second research question is important for managers and scholars. For
scholars, the use of an unobtrusive measure of ethical issue recognition has the potential
to settle a long-standing debate regarding relationships with gender in EDM, and EDM
regarding sexual harassment in organizations, in particular. In addition, for managers,
understanding how and whether individuals actually recognize instances of sexual
harassment in organizations (compared to how they say they recognize them) has wide
implications. This is because traditional questionnaire research, by dint of providing
participants with self-report items such as “Does this vignette depict an ethical issue?”
introduces the potential for (a) response priming through leading questions, and (b) high
levels of socially desirable responding, and thus, an unclear picture of how the
phenomenon actually unfolds in organizations.
Finally, the third research question is important for management researchers and
practitioners. Regarding the former, the consideration of multiple routes to behavior, as
well as multiple forms of behavior, often appears in managerial EDM research.
However, despite this, a comprehensive empirical test of these propositions is not
available. For managers, an understanding of automatically-elicited behavior is
important, as it allows for recommendations regarding organizational factors that may
foster such behavior. In addition, the assessment of automatic cognitive processes may
offer avenues for employee selection (Bing, LeBreton, Davison, Migetz, & James, 2007).
I investigate these questions in the context of sexual harassment in organizations
for three primary reasons. First, sexual harassment has become one of the central topics
within EDM and human resource management research (Bowes-Sperry & O'Leary-Kelly,
2005; Pierce & Aguinis, 2009; Pierce, Aguinis, & Adams, 2000). Second, researchers
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have made considerable progress in the study of sexual harassment, including
investigations of its relationships with automatic and controlled cognitive processes,
especially through an aggression-based view of sexual harassment (Bargh & Raymond,
1995; Bargh, Raymond, Pryor, & Strack, 1995; Bing, Stewart, et al., 2007; Douglas et al.,
2008; Frost, Ko, & James, 2007). Finally, sexual harassment bears considerably on
practitioners, as it represents one of the most pressing and prevalent issues for
organizations, and many individuals within organizations (Fitzgerald, Drasgow, Hulin,
Gelfand, & Magley, 1997).
It is worth noting that the study of ethics pertains to a very broad set of disciplines
including those under the headings of philosophy, psychology, and business, among
many others. Because each of these traditions is associated with varied naming
conventions and tendencies, a definition of construct space, particularly for the terms
ethical, moral, moral issue, normative ethics, and descriptive ethics, is warranted before
getting underway. First, at a broad level of classification, I follow O’Fallon and
Butterfield (2005), who delineate normative and descriptive ethics. The former refers to
behaviors that ought to be exhibited by individuals (Hosmer, 1987), and the latter refers
to that which actually happens, and is often more closely associated with an empirical
tradition. Put differently, descriptive ethics attempts to describe the occurrence,
antecedents, consequences, and mechanisms underlying ethics-related phenomena.
O’Fallon and Butterfield (2005), for instance, focus on empirical studies within the realm
of descriptive ethics theory. Indeed, the normative-descriptive distinction is applied to
scientific theory in general, especially that which pertains to business disciplines (Hunt,
2003).
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In their meta-analytic review, Kish-Gephart et al. (2010) follow definitions of
earlier researchers (e.g., Kaptein, 2008; Rest, 1986; Street et al., 2001; Treviño et al.,
2006) in that unethical behavior represents that which violates socially accepted norms. I
follow this tradition that appears in the behavioral business ethics literature. In addition, I
define a moral issue as that which potentially poses harm or benefit to targets of the
decision (Jones, 1991; Street et al., 2001). In this sense, many, if not most, managerial
decisions entail moral issues. This is because many managerial decisions, particularly
those made in the context of human resources, have either a positive (i.e., benefit) or
negative (i.e., harm) impact on employees’ lives. For instance, HR reactions to an
employee surplus, decisions regarding employee benefits, and decisions related to
employees’ work environment, all may potentially yield harm or benefit for employees. I
also follow earlier scholars (e.g., Reynolds, 2008) in treating the terms ethical and moral
as synonyms. Finally, while some authors adopt a very broad construct space for ethics
(e.g., Treviño et al., 2006, p. 952), I focus the scope of my review to ethical decision
making in particular, as has been the case for previous reviews (e.g., Ford & Richardson,
1994; Loe et al., 2000). The scope taken in this dissertation allows for rich hypothesis
development and broad implications for management scholars and HR practitioners.
The literature review will be structured as follows. First, because it will be central
to the remaining discussion, I describe the general nature of automatic and controlled
cognitive processes, and provide the central components and assumptions of dual-process
and dual-system models from the area of social cognition. In this section, I also address
the wide managerial literature that has already adopted this general approach. I then turn
to the progression of managerial EDM theory, beginning with its historical roots,
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followed by the popularization and rise to power of the standard model (Lapsley & Hill,
2008). I describe criticisms of the standard model, the current state of the science in this
research stream, and question whether newer views address these criticisms adequately. I
then describe how these EDM models fit into the dual-process and dual-system socialcognitive view, and consider, critique, and classify current managerial EDM models
through this lens. Finally, I present a section on the benefits of the more recent
managerial EDM models, focusing on methodological issues. The topics of sexual
harassment and aggression in organizations will be treated throughout the review, with
emphasis on the benefits of considering them through a dual-system social cognitive
viewpoint.

10

Chapter 2
Literature Review
Departure from Rationality: The Rise of Dual Process Models
For psychologists, attitudes have long served as a vehicle for understanding a
veritable library of behavioral phenomena. However, by the 1970s, it became clear that
this relationship was weak (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1977; Bentler & Speckart, 1979). Perhaps
one of the most remarkable and time-tested responses to this issue was set forth by
Fishbein and Ajzen’s (1975) theory of reasoned action, in which a mediating mechanism
(i.e., behavioral intention) was inserted. According to this view, attitudes predict
behavioral intentions, which, along with a host of other factors, predict overt behavior.
According to Hale, Householder, and Greene (2003), this approach was “born largely out
of frustration with traditional attitude-behavior research, much of which found weak
correlations between attitude measures and performance of volitional behaviors” (p. 259).
Indeed, the influence of this view can still be seen in psychology and related fields
including communications (e.g., Kim & Hunter, 1993), marketing (e.g., Shimp & Kavas,
1984), human resources (e.g., Steel & Ovalle, 1984), and cross-cultural management
(e.g., Lee & Green, 1991), among others. Critically, this approach allowed greater
understanding and prediction of behavior, and may be considered a milestone in this
regard.
Perhaps a second milestone in understanding the attitudebehavior link involved
the application of multi-process and multi-system models of cognition. These models
grew from a realization that self-reported attitudes present difficulty in predicting selfreported behaviors, especially those of a socially-sensitive nature (cf. Chugh, 2004;
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Greenwald, Poehlman, Uhlmann, & Banaji, 2009). Such models include two or more
cognitive systems or processes that vary in their level of automaticity, controllability, and
conscious awareness/access under which they operate. The hallmark of this second
seminal idea is the consideration of impulsive and reflective systems of cognition that
affect behavior (for reviews, see Smith & DeCoster, 2000; Strack & Deutsch, 2004;
Strack, Werth, & Deutsch, 2006). This idea contrasts with earlier models that operate by
way of a unitary system and which focus on a path of reasoned (i.e., reflective,
conscious) behavior. Not unlike the benefit realized by the insertion of the behavioral
intention, the consideration of multiple cognitive processes’ effects on behavior has
provided researchers the ability to better explain a wide range of human social behavior
including those relevant to organizational settings (Bing, LeBreton, et al., 2007; Bing,
Stewart et al., 2007).
Indeed, psychology has a long history of considering conscious (i.e., willed) and
unconscious (i.e., automatic) cognitive processes’ relationships with behavior. In fact,
that behavior is determined by conscious and unconscious processes is evident in Freud’s
(1901) concept of the id, ego, and super-ego. This idea was later likewise held by
behaviorists, humanists, self-theorists, and remains prominent in the modern cognitive
perspective (for a review, see Bargh & Chartrand, 1999). The state of the science in
psychological research in this regard is best described by Bargh and Chartrand (1999),
who note that “the debate has shifted from the existence (or not) of these different causal
forces to the circumstances under which one versus to other controls the mind” (p. 463).
Indeed, there has been documented a great deal of evidence demonstrating a direct
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influence of automatic cognition on perception on behavior. Bargh, Chen, and Burrows
(1996) showed this rather convincingly with the results of several experiments.
In Bargh et al.’s (1996) first experiment, participants were first primed with either
positively- or negatively-valenced words (e.g., happy and upset, respectively), after
which their behavior reflected typically polite or rude behavior (indicated by their
willingness to interrupt a conversation among the experiment’s confederates). In
Experiment 2, participants exposed to written material related to old age, compared to
those exposed to neutral material, walked more slowly down a corridor after the ostensive
completion of a study. These results indicate that the simple exposure to information in
an environment influences later behavior – often without awareness on the part of the
affected.
However, what can these results mean for the study of ethical decision making?
Clearly, in our daily interactive organizational lives, behavior is not “triggered by lists of
words,” (Bargh & Chartrand, 1999, p. 466), per se. For the present purposes, a similar
effect is described in studies of social interaction. Chartrand and Bargh (1999) evaluated
the effects of confederates’ behavior on participants’ behavior in a mimicry study.
Specifically, the authors found that, by dint of having shared a room with a face-rubbing
confederate, participants more frequently engaged in face-rubbing themselves. Similarly,
having been paired with a foot-shaking confederate, the participant engaged in footshaking more frequently. Most interestingly, “no one had any awareness of engaging in
these behaviors when asked at the end of the experiment” (Bargh & Chartrand, 1999, p.
467). These results indicate the automaticity of social behavior such that participants had
mimicked the behavior of the confederate without being aware of this behavior.
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Beyond mimicry studies, psychology’s recent attention to automaticity has
brought with it several methodological advances designed to assess automatic processes.
Made popular by Fazio, Sanbonmatsu, Powell, and Kardes (1986), the evaluative priming
procedure assesses the strength of the relationship between an attitude object and
contiguously presented stimuli varying in valence. Building on this idea, Greenwald,
McGhee, and Schwartz (1998) demonstrated the usefulness of a tool called the Implicit
Association Test (IAT). Each of these methods has been widely applied in psychology
for the purpose of understanding the attitudebehavior relation on topics as diverse as
food consumption (Perugini, 2005), addictive behaviors including smoking, drinking, and
drug use (e.g., Waters et al., 2003), racial bias (e.g., McConnell & Leibold, 2001), gender
bias (e.g., Richeson & Ambady, 2001), and many others. Among the benefits of the
measurement of automatic processes are (a) the circumvention of socially desirable
responding, (b) assessment of underlying associations outside of the realm of participant
awareness, although this is a matter of debate (Strack & Deutsch, 2004), and (c) a more
complete picture regarding automatic and controlled processes’ influence on behavior
(Bargh & Chartrand, 1999; Smith & DeCoster, 2000; Strack & Deutsch, 2004).
The idea of automatic cognitive processes’ influence on behavior has become so
popular in psychological research that Pizarro and Bloom (2003) and others referred to
the 1990s as the “decade of automaticity” in psychological research (p. 193). This idea
has spread to related fields, as phenomena like those described above have enormous
implications for management. Indeed, managers often enact decisions with wide-ranging
consequences for individuals, as well as for social justice, broadly speaking (Chugh,
2004). However, despite the essential role of managerial decisions, “psychological
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barriers to egalitarian behavior operate without intention in managers and organizations”
(p. 204). Put differently, managers perform activities in environments where deliberative
and thoroughly-reasoned action is not always possible. As a result, a less reasoned
strategy characterized by a mechanism other than reason becomes necessary for efficient
functioning (Reynolds, 2006b).
Management scholars have begun to view managerial behavior through various
social-cognitive multi-process lenses (Bing, LeBreton et al., 2007; Bing, Stewart et al.,
2007; Douglas et al., 2008; Frost et al., 2007; Reynolds, 2006b; Street et al., 2001; White
& White, 2006; Ziegert & Hanges, 2005). Indeed, examples exist wherein management
researchers, by dint of incorporating both automatic and controlled routes to behavior,
implicitly invoke multi-process mechanisms without explicit mention (e.g., Lee &
Mitchell, 1994).
Dual Processes Refined: Dual System Views
More recently, psychologists have set forth two interesting observations in the
multi-process literature. The first suggests that automatic and controlled cognitive
antecedents interact to predict behavior. Put differently, a pattern of congruent controlled
and automatic attitudes (e.g., a verbally stated no preference for working with white vs.
black individuals, and an implicit attitude score revealing the same) would predict
different behavioral outcomes than a verbally stated lack of preference coupled with an
implicit score revealing a strong preference for whites (McConnell & Leibold, 2001;
Perugini, 2005; Richetin, Perugini, Adjali, & Hurling, 2007). Not surprisingly, there is
behavioral prediction benefit associated with considering automatic and controlled
attitudes simultaneously, as well as their interaction (see Strack & Deutsch, 2004).
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The second interesting observation concerns the opposite side of the equation,
namely, behavior. Specifically, just as researchers have emphasized the consideration of
two major types of attitudinal antecedents to behavior, it is becoming common to
consider two types of behavior, often referred to as deliberative (i.e., consciously willed)
and reflexive (i.e., automatic) behavior (Strack & Deutsch, 2004; Strack et al., 2006).
Just as with attitudinal antecedents, which provide two broad classes of cognitive
antecedents to behavior, individuals can have two broad classes of behavior: What they
say they do (i.e., deliberative; self-reported behavior), and what they actually do
(reflexive; automatic behavior). This distinction was eloquently demonstrated by
Perugini (2005), who measured participants’ explicit and implicit attitudes toward snack
foods (i.e., healthy vs. unhealthy snacks). The study provided a measure of deliberative
behavior (i.e., by asking: How frequently do you eat items from each of these snack
categories?), as well as reflexive behavior (i.e., by measuring, unobtrusively, which of the
snacks the participants actually chose to consume after the ostensive completion of the
study). The results of the study were astonishing. Participants’ explicit attitudes (i.e.,
their controlled, self-reported evaluations of the healthy and unhealthy snacks) best
predicted deliberative behaviors (i.e., self-reported snack consumption frequencies),
whereas their implicit attitudes best predicted their reflexive snack choice. Put
differently, these results suggest that automatic, perhaps unconscious, attitudes better
predict what we actually do, whereas explicit self-reports of what we prefer predict
primarily what we say we do. As will become clearer, this distinction is best handled by
a newer class of social cognitive theory called dual system views.
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Observations like those just described have enormous implications for managerial
EDM research for three reasons. First, responses to ethical scenarios, particularly to
those that are relatively sensitive in nature (e.g., workplace deviance, Stewart, Bing,
Davison, Woehr, & McIntyre, 2009; sexual harassment, Tenbrunsel & Smith-Crowe,
2008) are prone to socially desirable responding, and this bias could potentially plague
research findings (Perugini & Leone, 2009; Tenbrunsel & Smith-Crowe, 2008; Treviño,
1992). Second, the literature on EDM has generally revealed a gender effect in responses
to ethical scenarios, whereby females are more likely than males to report recognizing an
ethical issue, and thereby respond to them differently (Blumenthal, 1998; Franke, Crown,
& Spake, 1997; Rotundo, Nguyen, & Sackett, 2001). However, research has also
indicated that socially desirable responding and gender are related, among other
individual differences variables (e.g., religiosity; Chung & Monroe, 2003). Untangling
the gender effect in EDM could be essential to a deeper understanding of the
phenomenon of sexual harassment in organizations, as well as HR managers’ responses
(e.g., recommended personnel actions; Pierce et al., 2004). Third, several researchers
(Bargh et al., 1995; Bargh & Raymond, 1995; Bing, Stewart et al., 2007; Douglas et al.,
2008; Frost et al., 2007) have suggested that behaviors classified as unethical (e.g.,
aggression; sexual harassment) are at least partially driven by automatic cognitive
processes, meaning that the cognitive antecedents (and perhaps the behavioral
consequences) occur automatically, and perhaps unconsciously. Each of these issues will
be revisited in detail in later sections.
Dual-system models represent a recent advancement within psychology, and they
appear to have effectively explained the findings discussed above (e.g., Perugini, 2005;
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Perugini & Leone, 2009). These models are distinguished from dual-process models in
that dual-system models propose that impulsive and reflective systems may operate
concurrently and have joint effects on behavior. In contrast, dual-process models
including the elaboration likelihood model (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986) either propose a one
or the other processing mode approach (under which, certain conditions will foster the
implementation of either an automatic or controlled information processing strategy), or a
sequential approach (in which reflective processes are preceded in time by impulsive
processes) (Smith & DeCoster, 2000; Strack & Deutsch, 2004). Dual-system approaches
take a parallel processing approach to these effects, and therefore must address the
properties of each of the systems, the nature of their interactions, and the mechanisms
through which each affects behavior.
In general, dual-system models posit that the cognitive systems varying in
automaticity compete for control over behavior. The multiple (i.e., typically two)
systems are differentiated on a number of dimensions. First, the impulsive system is
characterized by automaticity (i.e., little or no cognitive resources are required for its
operation), whereas the reflective system is characterized by controlled processes (i.e.,
considerable cognitive effort is required for its operation). To reiterate, controlled
processes played a central role in early attitudinal theory, as indicated by these theories’
names (e.g., theory of planned behavior or reasoned action, Fishbein & Ajzen 1975).
Second, the impulsive system is characterized by an experiential state of awareness, one
akin to a feeling of affect, whereas the reflective system is marked by a noetic state of
awareness typified by a feeling of knowing (Strack & Deutsch, 2004). In addition, the
contents and operations of the reflective system are generally accessible to the actor,
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whereas those of the impulsive system are not. Perhaps most importantly, information in
the two systems is represented and arranged in different ways. Further, the two systems
interact and thereby affect the contents of each other. For example, according to the
reflective-impulsive determinants model (RID; Strack & Deutsch, 2004), the reflective
system creates propositional statements, decisions, and intentions regarding the self or the
environment. However, the information with which the reflective system carries out
these tasks comes primarily from the activated contents of the impulsive system.
Provided that the impulsive system provides a foundation of cognition for the deployment
of most everyday behavior, this system will be treated in detail.
The RID describes the contents of the impulsive system in very much the same
way that memory theorists have described the structure of long-term memory systems for
decades (cf. McClelland, 1988). Specifically, the contents include hierarchically
arranged clusters of semantic representations and behavioral schemata weaved within an
associative network. Each associative link is developed over time, and its strength varies
as a function of behaviorist principles (e.g., contiguity, similarity, frequency, reward and
punishment). This architecture is common to most connectionist models that explain
various psychological phenomena including language learning (McClelland, 1988;
Rueckl, 2003). As such, all else being equal, two elements that co-occur more frequently
will exhibit a relatively stronger associative link than two that co-occur less frequently.
In a typical associative network, the activation of one element will result in the automatic
activation of other elements in proportion to their associative strengths. This basic idea
has been backed by decades of research on semantic priming. In one version of a
semantic priming task, participants are asked to pronounce a word as quickly as possible
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upon viewing it on a computer screen. The modal result –the semantic priming effect—
is quantified as the facilitated pronunciation of a word when it is preceded by a related
word. For example, participants may pronounce the word “CAT” in 600ms when it is
preceded by an unrelated prime such as “WINE.” However, participants may pronounce
“CAT” in only 500ms when it is preceded by a related word such as “DOG.” In this
case, a priming effect of 100 ms is said to exist. One popular explanation for this effect
has been called automatic spreading activation (Neely, 1977), which states that exposure
to environmental stimuli (e.g., images, words; events) results in an automatic spreading
wave of activation that prepares associated elements for later processing. The idea of
semantic priming forms the basis for most implicit attitude measures. Indeed, Fazio et al.
(1986), in one of the first demonstrations of implicit attitude measurement, draw directly
from this idea.
According to the RID, information in the impulsive system can become activated
through several pathways including the observation of the external environment, one’s
own behavior, and the operations of the reflective system; this demonstrates the
interactive nature of the two systems. For instance, one may observe an orange on a
table, and this simple act of observation will activate a hierarchically-arranged associative
network related to the orange, which in turn will activate appropriate behavioral schemata
related to that associative cluster (e.g., eat). Interestingly, the automatic activation of
behavioral schemata may result in an experiential state of awareness, and in this case, an
associated physiological response (i.e., hunger). Likewise, simply conversing about
various food-related topics (which is generated by the reflective system) may activate the
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same behavioral schema residing in the impulsive system, again resulting in the same
experiential state and physiological response (cf. Strack & Deutsch, 2004).
As previously stated, the dual-systems approaches (e.g., RID) are demonstrably
unique in that they consider that both systems may have a simultaneous effect on an overt
response. The reflective system includes an effortful system of deciding and behavioral
intention, similar to that made popular by Fishbein and Ajzen (1975), which then will
activate an appropriate behavioral schema contained in the impulsive system. In contrast,
the impulsive system will activate behavioral schemata through the process of automatic
spreading activation. Under certain circumstances (e.g., familiarity, fatigue,
intoxication), the reflective system may fail to be engaged, resulting in the dominance of
behavioral control by the impulsive process. In contrast, the impulsive system remains in
a constant state of operation and cannot be disengaged (Strack & Deutsch, 2004). The
automaticity of the impulsive system can thus be thought of as beneficial in some
circumstances. Humans possess a sort of autopilot that is engaged during times of crisis
and when reflective processing capacity is not available for deployment. However, the
impulsive system can also lead to deleterious behavior such as organizational aggression,
sexual harassment, and counterproductive workplace behavior (Bargh et al., 1995; Bargh
& Chartrand, 1999; Bing, Stewart et al., 2007). This does not imply that impulsive
processes cannot be modified, however. Indeed, the influence of the impulsive system
can be overridden by the operation of the reflective system under certain conditions, and
this is especially relevant for the potential to train automatic processes (Seligman &
Kahana, 2009; Strack & Deutsch, 2004), thus providing one potential avenue through
which to circumvent undesirable behavior in organizations.

21

Management researchers have noted the need for the application of multi-process
models. Reflecting on the oft-encountered situations of distraction and limited attentional
resources by managers, Marquardt and Hoeger (2009, p. 160) note, “intuitive processes
as well as implicit moral attitudes should therefore affect managerial ethical decisionmaking considerably.” Similarly, Lapsley and Hill (2008) note, “what seems required,
then, is a model of moral cognition that articulates both the deliberative and automatic
processes that underlie moral behavior” (p. 315). Similar arguments have been set forth
regarding aggression in organizations (Douglas et al., 2008), workplace deviance
(Stewart et al., 2009), and sexual harassment (Siebler, Sabelus, & Bohner, 2008; Treviño
et al., 2006; Zigarelli, 1997), among others. Together, these examples are making an
increasingly convincing argument that the classic, controlled, view of behavior in
organizations is becoming obsolete. Research addressing this topic has begun to trickle
into managerial EDM research, perhaps as a reaction to the reign of the classic controlled
process view. Next, I turn to the roots of the classic view.
Rational Roots of EDM and Moral Judgment
While there exist many early theories on ethical decision making in business
contexts (for a review, see Jones, 1991), this review will focus on those contributions that
have either appeared in management outlets, or have directly informed and/or influenced
management theory. This practice is consistent with previous reviews (e.g., Loe et al.,
2000).
According to some authors (Skitka, Bauman, & Lytle, 2009), the early reign of
conscious reasoning during EDM can be attributed to the zeitgeist in which Kohlberg’s
(1976) stages of moral development theory appeared, when secularism and universally-
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applicable moral principles were two pursued goals in public education. According to
Skitka et al. (2009), “many scholars, educators, and parents alike were dissatisfied with
education programs grounded in moral relativism. Therefore, many prominent theories
of morality are rooted in rationalistic philosophy, stemming from ideas espoused by
Spinoza, Kant, and others” (p. 568). As a result of this historical setting, early EDM
theory in psychology favored mechanisms of controlled cognitive process governance.
Rational models proposed that individuals engage in purposive and conscious
reasoning during the ethical decision making process. Indeed, Kohlberg (1976) explicitly
invoked this mode of controlled cognition to explain variance in moral judgment as a
function of human development. As Lapsley and Hill (2008) elucidate, “he insisted…on
a principle of phenomenalism for defining moral phenomena. This principle asserts that
‘moral reasoning is the conscious process of using ordinary moral language’” (p. 314).
Within EDM theory, the application of Kohlbergian moral development, and, by
extension, conscious moral reasoning, played a central role. Prominent early examples
that have had a large impact on management theory include Rest’s (1986) four-stage
model and Treviño’s (1986) person-situation interactionist model of ethical decision
making. In Treviño’s model, a link is proposed between cognitions and (un)ethical
behavior, a relationship moderated by situational factors (immediate job context;
organizational culture; characteristics of the work) and individual factors (ego strength;
field dependence; locus of control). Treviño (1986), in describing the incorporation of
moral development into her managerial EDM model, noted,
The individual reacts to an ethical dilemma with cognitions determined by his or
her cognitive moral development stage [which] determines how an individual
thinks about ethical dilemmas, his or her process of deciding what is right or
wrong. (p. 602, italics added)
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A contiguous but ultimately more influential model was proposed in the field of
educational psychology by Rest (1986), who described EDM as a four-stage cognitive
process. The first stage of the model, recognition, represents the process by which one
becomes aware that information in the environment involves ethically-relevant content.
Next, conscious deliberation yields a moral judgment, the point at which one comes to a
conclusion regarding the ethicality of the information under evaluation. Finally,
according to the four-stage model, moral judgment allows for the formation of behavioral
intentions, which in turn influence later behavior.
For the present discussion, two of Rest’s (1986) stages are particularly relevant.
Specifically, the first stage requires that individuals recognize that a scenario contains
ethically-relevant information. The outcome of this stage is referred to as moral
awareness, which, in this context, implies a conscious phenomenon (Posner & Snyder,
1975; Schneider & Shiffrin, 1977; Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977), although some
psychologists have called into question the automaticity-unawareness assumption (e.g.,
Smith & DeCoster, 2000), or even consider awareness an epiphenomenon (e.g., Strack &
Deutsch, 2004). Importantly, for Rest (1986), moral issue recognition represents a
necessary prerequisite for the continued progression through the latter three EDM stages.
Further, because this model proposes that recognition must precede moral reasoning, and
that moral reasoning must occur for moral behavior to occur, it logically follows that
without conscious moral awareness, ethical behavior is unlikely. It is for this reason that
the recognition of ethical content is considered one of the most critical stages of the fourstage model (Reynolds, 2006; Reynolds, 2008; Street et al., 2001; Tenbrunsel & SmithCrowe, 2008; Treviño, 1992).
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Another relevant concern related to Rest’s (1986) model involves the nature of his
second proposed decision phase, moral judgment. Importantly, the outcome of this stage
depends on the decision maker’s level of moral development, and thus moral judgment
and conscious processing are positively related, as suggested earlier by Kohlberg (1976).
These two essential characteristics of Rest’s (1986) model, and their inherent limitations,
are discussed in the next section.
In retrospect, Lapsley and Hill’s (2008) observation regarding the influence of the
Kohlbergian view led them to appropriately label it the “Standard Model of moral
development” (p. 314). Undoubtedly, the Kohlbergian view had enormous impact on the
fields of education, psychology, and business, among others. Indeed, the same label may
be applied to Rest’s (1986) four-stage model of EDM and its descendants. This
theoretical view on EDM would become –and remain- the standard model in business
disciplines for nearly two decades. Indeed, as Shao, Aquino, and Freeman (2008) noted,
“For many years, the cognitive developmental model first proposed by Kohlberg (1969)
and later extended by Rest and his colleagues…has been the most frequently applied
theoretical explanation for ethical behavior in business” (p. 513). I turn now to the
migration and rise of the rational EDM approach to the field of management in particular.
Following this description, I provide a critique of the rational model’s central assumption,
and describe benefits of relaxing this assumption.
Rational Managerial EDM Viewpoints
The most frequently applied EDM model in the field of management is Jones’s
(1991) issue-contingent model, which was largely built on Rest’s (1986) four-stage
model, and thus was imported the rational view of EDM. This model provided a much-
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needed lens through which to view the ethical decision making process. Jones (1991)
argued that although existing models (e.g., Treviño, 1986) consider a variety of
individual- and organizational-level variables, they together fail to consider the
characteristics of the ethical issue itself, and its effects on EDM processes and outcomes.
Jones suggested that the moral intensity of the ethical issue would have an impact on
each of Rest’s (1986) four stages, and this was an intuitive and essential consideration
(Street et al., 2001).
According to Jones (1991), moral intensity is a construct with six dimensions that
together account for an ethical issue’s overall energy or severity. The first dimension,
magnitude of consequences, refers to the total amount of harm or benefit exhibited in the
scenario. The second dimension, social consensus, refers to the extent to which there
exists agreement among a referent group regarding the goodness or badness of an act.
Next, the probability of effect refers to the odds that the event will occur, as well as
whether the act will actually lead to harm or benefit. Jones (1991) provided the example,
“selling a gun to a known armed robber has a greater probability of harm than selling a
gun to a law-abiding citizen” (p. 375). The fourth and fifth dimensions relate to
contiguity; temporal immediacy refers to closeness in time between the act and its
repercussions, and proximity refers to closeness in the social or physical realm. Finally,
the sixth dimension, concentration of effect, is “an inverse function of the number of
people affected by an act of given magnitude” (p. 378).
Moral intensity has played a central role in empirical EDM studies in business
disciplines (for a review, see O'Fallon & Butterfield, 2005), and has been applied to the
study of sexual harassment (e.g., O'Leary-Kelly & Bowes-Sperry, 2001). For example,
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Pierce et al. (2004) found that the moral intensity of workplace romance features
influence organizationally-relevant outcomes. Thus, to be sure, Jones’s (1991) model
exhibited much strength (Robin, Reidenbach, & Forrest, 1996; Street, Robertson, &
Geiger, 1997; Tenbrunsel & Smith-Crowe, 2008), and has had a major influence on
research across many areas of business ethics. Street et al. (2001) summarize the
strengths of Jones’s model by noting that Jones’s (1991) incorporation of existing
models, as well as the introduction of moral intensity, accomplished both
comprehensiveness and parsimony. In addition, the model fostered a great deal of
research on business ethics. Indeed, the paper in which Jones’s model appeared has been
cited 1385 times according to Google Scholar and 575 times according to Web of
Science.
As described earlier, another strength of Jones’s (1991) model, as well as other
rational approaches (e.g., Rest, 1986; Treviño, 1986), was a popular theoretical
foundation based on Kohlberg’s (1976; Kohlberg & Hersh, 1977) stages of moral
development. However, the seeds of obsolescence for rational managerial EDM theories
may lie with this very incorporation. Indeed, Kohlbergian views, which in turn rely on
both Piaget’s views on human development as well as a Kantian view on rational ethics
(Lapsley & Hill, 2008), have fallen out of favor among social scientists. As Lapsley and
Hill explain, “after 50 years the Standard Model now looks a bit shop worn. It no longer
animates the leading edge of developmental science and there is increasing recognition
that the field of moral development is at an important crossroad as it enters its ‘postKohlberg’ phase (Lapsley & Narvaez, 2005)” (p. 314). Similarly, Tenbrunsel and SmithCrowe (2008) note, “And thus, the story goes: reason was king. It was king. While this
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rationalist approach has dominated the study of ethical decision making, its position has
begun to weaken” (p. 573).
As a result, rational models (e.g., Jones, 1991), as well as the general Kohlbergian
approach, have been called into question by several scholars for its rational actor
assumption. As Sonenshein (2007) notes, rationalist approaches “view deliberate and
extensive reasoning as a precursor for ethical behavior [and] claim that moral reasoning
is used to make moral judgments” (p. 1024). This is seen as a limitation because, by its
nature, reasoning is a conscious process accompanied by decision-maker awareness
(Chen & Bargh, 1999). While more recent EDM theories (e.g., Reynolds, 2006b)
generally do not rule out the possibility of rational processes’ influence on managerial
EDM, a great deal of research in both psychology (e.g., McConnell & Leibold, 2001) and
management (e.g., Frost et al., 2007) has demonstrated the predictive validity of
cognitive processes that operate outside of the actor’s awareness.
Criticisms of Rational EDM Views
As described earlier, in the years following the publication of Rest’s (1986)
model, the controlled managerial EDM view gained momentum in managerial research,
where it was adopted to explain individual and organizational factors (Treviño, 1986),
moral intensity (Jones, 1991), emotion (Gaudine & Thorne, 2001), elaboration likelihood
(Street et al., 2001), and culture (Thorne & Saunders, 2002), among others. At the same
time, there was a negative attitude building toward the standard model approach among
many psychologists (Krebs & Denton, 2005). However, each of these models likewise
explicitly incorporated some form of effortful moral reasoning as an antecedent to ethical
behavior, thus echoing the Kohlbergian and Kantian rationalist view. Indeed, as will be
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described further, for two decades in managerial research, there was no evidence that a
substantial departure from the standard model had occurred. As discussed by Reynolds
(2006b), the field of managerial ethics remained “entrenched in a cognitive approach that
portrays the ethical decision-making process as a completely deliberate and reasoned
exercise” (p. 737). In light of the continued development of automaticity research in both
management and psychology, scholars built a case against the rational approach, and
frowned upon its modification as a vehicle for progress, as Tenbrunsel and Smith-Crowe
(2008) eloquently put it, “it is unlikely that new boxes and arrows can simply be added to
existing models and theories” (p. 586).
As described earlier, the most common criticism of the four-stage model involves
its assumption of rationality. Reflecting on Jones’s (1991) observations, Reynolds
(2006b) echoed that Rest was “very explicit in identifying his model as a cognitive model
of ethical decision making—an attempt to understand what individuals think when they
encounter ethical issues [and that] the majority of the most oft-cited models of ethical
decision making reflect the four-stage process originally conceptualized by Rest” (p.
737). This became problematic for researchers, due to moral reasoning’s inability to
predict moral behavior (Shao et al., 2008). In addition, scholars critiqued the Rest-based
view’s four-stage process. As Lapsley and Hill (2008) noted, there were “doubts about
its empirical warrant and how to understand core constructs such as stage, sequence and
structure” (p. 314). Indeed, the assumption of a stepwise, piecemeal approach
dissatisfied many scholars, in part because cognitive stages necessitated a relationship
between reasoning and ethical behavior, however defined. This stream of argumentation
was further elaborated in terms of Rest’s (1986) stages. Specifically, at least two
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theoretically distinct cognitive stages (moral issue recognition and moral judgment)
seemed unjustifiably distinguished (Tenbrunsel & Smith-Crowe, 2008).
Regardless of these criticisms, psychologists and management scholars continued
to adapt and build on the classic Kohlbergian view (e.g., Rest, 1986). Indeed, examples
of the standard model’s strong influence can still be seen in modern management outlets;
often, these scholars fail to provide mention of newer models (e.g., Carlson, Kacmar, &
Wadsworth, 2009; Chen, Pan, & Pan, 2009), and rational models remain the most
commonly cited among management scholars, although less so among psychologists.
Within the field of management, Reynolds’s (2006b) and Sonenshein’s (2007) models
were the first to explicitly shed reliance on rational cognitive processes in EDM, a full
two decades after its first appearance in the field of management by Treviño (1986).
Some (Lapsley & Hill, 2008, p. 314) interpreted the standard model’s continued
popularity, as well as attempts to adopt it to emerging contrary evidence as a barrier to
progress, and suggested that the approach was showing signs of a “degenerating research
program.”
Automatic EDM Views
As described earlier, as evidence regarding the suitability of models that
considered non-rational (i.e., intuitive; relatively automatic) cognitive antecedents of
behavior accumulated in related fields, management scholars called for its adoption to the
problem of EDM. Specifically, as psychological research on the automaticity of moral
judgment became more widely known, it became clear that “ethical decision-making
entails more than just conscious reasoning” (Salvador & Folger, 2009, p. 1). Haidt
(2001) provided one of the first psychological models on moral judgment that stressed
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automaticity, in which he pointed out four primary limitations of rational models, or,
more specifically, “reasons for doubting the causality of reasoning in moral judgment” (p.
815). Haidt’s first reason was based on the underpinnings of dual-process models in
psychology that assert the operation of both an automatic process (what Haidt called
intuition) and a controlled process (i.e., reasoning) as antecedents to judgment. As Haidt
(2001, p. 819) noted, “It is now widely accepted in social and cognitive psychology that
two processing systems are often at work when a person makes judgments or solves
problems.”
Second, Haidt (2001) noted that elicitation of moral reasoning is not natural, per
se, but instead that the reasoning process is motivated. For Haidt, the reasoning process
following moral judgment was “more like a lawyer defending a client than a judge or
scientist seeking truth” (p. 820). Third, Haidt proposed that our experience of a priori
objective moral reasoning is illusory in nature, in that it yields primarily post hoc
justifications. Finally, Haidt’s fourth criticism provided that available evidence points to
a stronger relationship between affective processes (one type of automatic process or
intuition; cf. Forgas, 1995; Haidt, 2002; Zajonc, 1980) and moral judgment than moral
reasoning and moral judgment.
A corpus of elegant research began to make the intuition-moral judgment link
clearer. Wheatley and Haidt (2005), for instance, provided a direct test of this proposed
link. While under hypnosis, some participants were induced to react with a feeling of
disgust upon encountering an otherwise neutral word (e.g., often; take). The results
revealed that those participants who had undergone this association provided more
negative judgments regarding an hypothetical ethical scenario while out of the hypnotic
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state. The authors concluded that an automatic affective influence, albeit one entirely
unrelated to the particular scenario, influenced moral judgment, thus demonstrating the
link between intuition and judgment.
Similar effects of automatic and controlled cognitive processes on outcomes have
been demonstrated in management research. Marquardt and Hoeger (2009) found that
implicit and explicit attitudes, which represent automatic and controlled attitude object
evaluations, respectively, predict the results of EDM stages. Similarly, Reynolds et al.
(2010) recently found that implicit attitudes regarding the morality of business predict inbasket behaviors, the outcomes of which vary with respect to their morality, and that
contextual cues influence this relationship. Results conceptually similar to these studies
were found in a recent dissertation (Newitt, 2009) with measures similar to Betsch’s
(2004) preference for intuition and deliberation (PID) scale. Outside of the moral
judgment domain, Baron (1987) found that participants induced to be in a positive or
negative mood state made emotion-congruent judgments regarding employment
suitability toward confederates who posed as job applicants. Similar effects have been
demonstrated in the field of leadership (e.g., Brown & Keeping, 2005), and juror
judgments (Wegener, Kerr, Fleming, & Petty, 2000), among a host of other contexts (for
a review, see Forgas, 1995).
Managerial EDM: Dual-Process Views
Street et al. (2001) introduced the first managerial EDM model that explicitly
allowed for the influence of automaticity on EDM outcomes, under certain
circumstances. Specifically, these authors applied Petty and Cacioppo’s (1986)
elaboration likelihood model (ELM) to the EDM process. The model proposed that
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decision makers may proceed along distinct automatic or controlled cognitive routes
(best described as a continuum; cf. Petty & Wegener, 1999), and provided propositions
regarding the level of cognitive expenditure associated with the route traveled and its
corresponding influence on the decision process, as well as its influence on behavior.
According to these authors and those of the ELM, individuals travel the path of least
cognitive difficulty by default, unless certain conditions are met. This concept is similar
to bounded rationality (Kahneman, 2003; Kern & Chugh, 2009; Simon, 1957), and has
been common to psychological models of social cognition for several decades (e.g.,
heuristic-systematic model; Chaiken, 1980). Indeed, that individuals apply the easiest
cognitive route has been variously referred to as the cognitive miser, cognitively lazy, and
others (cf. Tetlock, 1983).
According to Street et al. (2001), individual and situational factors will influence
both one’s motivation and ability to engage in effortful message processing (e.g.,
controlled processing of an ethical scenario). If motivation and ability are present,
individuals will travel along a relatively central (i.e., controlled) information processing
route, and, according to Street et al. (2001), will then proceed along Rest’s (1986) fourstage path. As such, Street et al. (2001) did not explicitly shed the rational approach, but
allowed for conditions under which calculative reason was not applied. As an illustration
of the model’s comprehensiveness, Street et al. incorporated Jones’s (1991) moral
intensity construct as a situational characteristic that influences one’s motivation to
process message content. Thus, as moral intensity increases, one will be more likely to
adopt an increasingly central information processing strategy. However, if motivation
and ability to process message content are not present (e.g., if moral intensity is low),
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individuals will proceed along a peripheral (i.e., automatic) information processing route,
along which one’s decision is made on the basis of non-ethical considerations.
Interestingly, Street et al.’s (2001) model, while it should be considered a
theoretical milestone in that it allowed for the influence of automatic cognitive processes,
remains plagued with many of the shortcomings of the standard Kohlbergian model.
First, because decisions influenced by relatively automatic processes are made on the
basis of non-ethical considerations, and lead to a “reduced probability of ethical
behavior” (Street et al., 2001, p. 265), the model maintains that moral behavior is
preceded by moral reasoning. Second, one may challenge the assumption of a linear
relationship between moral intensity and depth of information processing, all else being
equal. For instance, both very minor moral violations (e.g., stealing a paperclip from a
co-worker’s desk without permission) and very severe moral violations (e.g., murdering
fellow employees) may likewise recruit very few cognitive resources before one arrives
at their corresponding judgments. It remains possible that mid-range ethical scenarios,
perhaps best described as dilemmas would elicit greater amounts of cognitive resources
during the decision process.
Another important limitation of Street et al.’s (2001) model lies in the assumption
of non-overlapping automatic and controlled cognitive processes. Put differently, Street
et al. (2001) assumed an either/or route approach to behavior, thus preventing the
simultaneous interplay between automatic and controlled cognitive processes. As will be
described further, as early as 1990, psychologists (e.g., Fazio, 1990) had pointed out this
shortcoming of the ELM and related dual-process models. Indeed, dual-process/dualsystem models in psychology have realized substantial benefit by considering the
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simultaneous influence of automatic and controlled cognitive processes, and now
seemingly refrain from the either/or route approach (cf. Strack & Deutsch, 2004).
Managerial EDM: Sensemaking-Intuition View
Management scholars continued to set forth theories that considered EDM
automaticity. In what may have been a large move toward the cognitive automaticity
view, Sonenshein (2007) proposed the sensemaking-intuition model (SIM) of managerial
ethical decision making, which was largely based on Haidt’s (2001) model from
psychology. The SIM challenged “the privileged status of moral reasoning in rationalist
models by claiming that responses to ethical issues are not always based on deliberate
and extensive reasoning” (Sonenshein, 2007, p. 1022), and placed a relatively strong
emphasis on Haidt’s (2001) intuition mechanism at the expense of reasoning processes.
Indeed, the SIM follows modern social-psychological research in noting that “individuals
rarely engage in the deliberate, extensive reasoning proposed by rationalist models …
Instead, individuals engage in mental processes outside their conscious awareness and
guidance” (Sonenshein, 2007, p. 1025).
According to the SIM, individuals proceed through a three-stage process during
EDM: issue construction, intuitive judgment, and justification. The model provides that
decision makers first undergo a construction phase, during which meaning is extracted
from the ethical scenario as a function of motivations and expectations. This process is
influenced by individual level and collective level factors, and is an automatic process by
default, although cognitive effort may be applied to the process under certain situations.
Indeed, this is an important distinction because, should the sensemaking-construction
process require effortful cognitive resources, then the model would be relatively difficult
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to test. In this hypothetical case, the model would propose a controlled-automaticcontrolled series of cognitive processes, as will be clear later. To complicate the issue,
the second phase of the SIM (i.e., intuitive judgment) occurs instantaneously after the
first (issue construction). However, Sonenshein’s (2007) citation of Boland and Tenkasi
(1995), and others, allows some inferences regarding the level of control present during
the sensemaking-construction stage.
Within the sensemaking literature, there exists a variety of opinions regarding the
automaticity or control of the sensemaking process (Weick, 1995). However, three
pieces of evidence lead to the conclusion that the SIM presents an automatic approach.
First, as cited in Boland and Tenkasi (1995), Collins (1983) noted that “our giving of
meaning to objects—interpretive practices are so automatic that we do not notice that any
interpretation is involved” (p. 90). Indeed, the sensemaking tradition exhibits such
automaticity in some of its earliest foundations, including the oft-cited phrase, “How can
I know what I think until I see what I say” (Wallas, 1926, p. 95).
Next, the SIM proposes that the construction-sensemaking process is driven by
two individual-level factors, motivation and expectancy, “Individuals see what they
expect to see, but they also see what they want to see. The underlying psychological
process comes from motivational drives, which represent an individual’s (unconscious)
desires… Subconscious motivational drives produce variance in how individuals interpret
social stimuli.” (Sonenshein, 2007, p. 1029-1030). To reiterate this view in terms of
scripts and unawareness, two terms indicative of automaticity, Sonenshein (2007, p.
1026) noted,
Expectations, often encapsulated in scripts, place limitations on what individuals
perceive (Fiske & Taylor, 1991; Gioia, 1992). This challenges their ability to
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consider all relevant information when making decisions. At the same time,
individuals have strong motivational drives that affect how they see social stimuli,
making them very partisan actors (Pittman, 1998), often without being aware of it.
(Griffin & Buehler, 1993)
Finally, the SIM supports the notion that conscious, effortful cognitive processes occur
only after intuitive judgment (step 2), at least moral reasoning in particular, “my
contention is not that moral reasoning does not happen but that it may occur after an
individual has responded to the issue using intuition” (Sonenshein, 2007, p. 1031).
Interestingly, however, the SIM also allows for two collective-level factors that
influence the construction phase by eliciting effortful processing. One of these processes,
seeking information from other organizational members (referred to as social anchors),
requires communicative input and thus requires effortful message processing to arrive at
a modified interpretation of the situation. However, as Sonenshein (2007) noted,
“Managers rarely rely on others to help them respond to situations that may have ethical
implications … for a variety of reasons… [including] dominant institutional logics, social
conflict, and general organizational barriers to raising ethical issues” (p. 1030). Under
those circumstances in which managers are able to overcome these barriers to seeking
input from social anchors, effortful information processing may occur. However, this
event is taken to be relatively rare, and as such, the construction phase should be seen as
generally automatic, especially when decisions are made in isolation.
The second stage of the SIM is critical for the present discussion. In this stage,
individuals undergo an intuitive judgment, “an automatic, affective reaction … such as
‘good’ or ‘bad’” (Sonenshein, 2007, p. 1031). In contrast to earlier rational approaches,
for the SIM, intuitive judgment was entirely automatic, “As soon as an individual
constructs an ethical issue, that individual instantaneously makes an intuitive judgment”
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(Sonenshein, 2007, p. 1027, italics added). Indeed, “Individuals routinely develop
intuitions about social stimuli (especially at work …), and while moral reasoning might
be used to override an individual’s initial intuitions, such “reasoning is rarely used to
question one’s own attitudes or beliefs” (Haidt, 2001, p. 819).
Finally, the SIM provides a third stage, explanation and justification, which plays
an important role for social processes. According to the model, individuals may engage
moral reasoning after an automatic judgment, when necessary. To clarify, some (see
Weick, 1995) in the sensemaking tradition may refute the automaticity of issue
construction claim, noting that sensemaking is a social process, involves persuasion, and
thus cannot be automatic. However, the SIM and the theory of moral judgment on which
it is based (Haidt, 2001) account for this phenomenon, and this is the primary purpose of
the explanation and justification phase. According to Haidt (2001), moral judgments are
made automatically, and reasoning is applied for the justification of the judgment, post
hoc – despite the fact that we may believe that our reasoning efforts lead to judgment, a
phenomenon Haidt (2001) referred to as the “wag-the-dog illusion” (p. 823). Regarding
social processes, in this view, justification of judgment is used to impact, over time,
others’ intuitions, such that, upon encountering a similar situation, their automatic and
intuitive processes are permitted automatic cognitive control, despite the fact that those
whose cognitive contents have been influenced may feel that they have gone through an a
priori reasoning process. Haidt (2001) referred to this as the “wag-the-other-dog’s-tail
illusion” (p. 823).
Thus, it is important to reiterate the automaticity of the SIM. According to this
view, phase one (sensemaking) is an automatic categorization or interpretation of
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environmental events. This phase of the model allows for individual differences in the
interpretation of ethical issues under the condition of cognitive automaticity, and
influences the post-hoc explanation and justification stage. Following automatic
interpretation, an automatic intuition-guided judgment occurs. Finally, explanation and
justification occur, particularly if required of the decision-maker.
Managerial EDM: Neurocognitive View
Reynolds (2006b) provided a neurocognitive account of managerial ethics. He
made a clear up-front departure from rational models of EDM by focusing on the actual
EDM process rather than what is reflectively cognized during the EDM process. Put
differently, Reynolds (2006b) focused on how agents think rather than what agents think
during EDM. To this end, Reynolds’s (2006b) model specified two cognitive systems, an
X-system and a C-system. The former refers to an automatic and unconscious system of
pattern matching. By this process, stimuli are encountered in the environment, and
automatically activate related concepts in an associative network (cf. McClelland, 1988).
Importantly, existing stored concepts include not only physical objects. Indeed, such
concepts are defined in much the same way that Fazio et al. (1986) defined attitude
objects – very broadly. As Reynolds (2006b) notes, “This process is not just about props,
though. Ethical situations such as bribery, fraud, misrepresentation, sexual harassment,
and the like have prototypical characteristics and are therefore represented in
multidimensional structures” (p. 739). Importantly, the X-system’s operation is defined
as exclusively automatic.
The idea that the X-system has the ability to operate in the absence of cognitive
effort has a functional evolutionary purpose (Arndt, Greenberg, & Cook, 2002; Krebs,
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2008; MacDonald, 2009), as well as an everyday cognitive resource conservatory
purpose (Strack & Deutsch, 2004). Indeed, one can imagine instances, in the state of
nature and likewise in everyday business environments, where it would be either taxing,
disadvantageous, or both, to apply conscious reasoning to understand each and every
element in the environment. Thus, in our everyday encounters, we rely on the X-system
to process most sensory information that we encounter, if for no other reason than to
simply free up resources for other cognitive processes that require effort and attention
(Reynolds, 2006b). However, Reynolds noted an important caveat to the X-system’s
tendency to operate on autopilot, specifically, it is unable to adequately and accurately
process novel combinations of stimuli, and at that point, calls on higher-order cognitive
processes to make an effortful contribution. In this way, EDM processes regarding
relatively infrequent scenarios takes on an element of cognitive control. Higher-order
reasoning processes reside in what Reynolds (2006b) referred to as the C-system, which I
describe next.
Reynolds (2006b) identified two key operating principles of the C-system. First,
this system is operationally distinct from the X-system, meaning that C-system is not
simply X-system writ consciously. Specifically, while the X-system operates
automatically, by way of associative networks connecting environmental stimulus events
to sub-symbolic nodes, the C-system operates consciously, with abstract and rule-based
logic. The C-system is reminiscent of what rationalist models of EDM propose as the
primary operating mode. The second principle of the C-system deals with the origin of
prototypes in the X-system, and in so doing, defines an interaction between the two
systems. Specifically, the C-system, through its first encounters with novel stimulus
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events, and through repetition over time, has the ability to modify the associative network
of the X-system. This idea is compatible with that described by connectionist theory
from cognitive psychology, especially theory on human memory systems and language
learning processes (McClelland, 1988; Rueckl, 2003).
Interestingly, Reynolds’s model explicitly addressed the mechanisms of ethical
issue recognition and ethical judgment, as originally proposed by Rest (1986). Reynolds
proposed that each of these steps may occur preconsciously and automatically. As
Reynolds (2006b) describes of one particular instance of ethical issue recognition,
…when a supervisor… secretly offers a promotion in exchange for sexual favors,
the elements of this experience are immediately processed, organized, and
matched to an existing prototype of quid pro quo sexual harassment. The situation
can then be presented reflexively to consciousness as an ethical (and legal) issue.
In this way, ethical prototypes allow decision makers to recognize ethical
situations automatically. (p. 739)
Thus, while ethical issue recognition may eventually be represented in consciousness, it
is important to note that, in this case, its antecedent processes are automatic and their
operations occur under the radar of the decision maker’s conscious awareness. However,
as noted earlier, whether the issue will be handled by the X-system depends on whether
an adequate prototype match is established. In the case of an inadequate prototype
match, Reynolds’s (2006b) model becomes much more rational. In this case, “the Csystem will be asked to analyze the situation, apply moral rules, and make a judgment”
(p. 741). Thus, ethical issues handled by the X-system involve effortful reasoning only
after judgment, behavioral intention, and behavior have occurred. In contrast, ethical
issues handled by the C-system will require that conscious reasoning precede ethical
judgment, intention, and behavior.
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While Reynolds’s (2006b) model is relatively comprehensive and parsimonious,
one may perceive difficulty in drawing hypotheses from this model, because the
understanding of which cognitive system processes information relies on a determination
of whether the decision maker holds a concrete X-system prototype for the stimulus
event. However, this may not be as problematic as it seems, and Reynolds (2006b)
provides some guidance regarding the conditions under which the X- or C-system assume
control over the decision. Indeed, certainly every ethical situation imaginable contains
some degree of novelty, whether in regard to the particular actors involved, the particular
nature of the acts, or other defining features. It seems, however, that the X-system
rapidly categorizes stimulus events in much the same way that the philosopher Plato
described ideal forms (cf. Weimer, 1973). For instance, barring a few uncommon
examples, most individuals would recognize a ‘dog’ as a ‘dog’ regardless of its feature
variants (e.g., overall size, hair length, ear length, tail length). Indeed, evidence suggests
that dogs themselves have the ability to do this (Racca et al., 2009). Understandably,
however, there are certain breeds of dog that may, at first glance, be confused for a cat, a
wolf, a coyote, or perhaps another animal. As an example, upon first encountering a
Chinese crested dog, an atypically small, hairless breed, according to Reynolds’s (2006b)
view, the X-system may request additional processing from the C-system to use
conscious rules to categorize (i.e., judge) the atypical breed. However, upon future
encounters, one may automatically recognize it as a dog, and not mistake it for a cat, and
this should increasingly be the case for rare exemplars. The same may be true for
common and uncommon forms of sexual harassment in organizations. For instance,

42

message processing involving a female harasser and a male target may elicit greater
levels of cognitive resources than the reverse scenario.
As additional evidence for the preeminence of the X-system, Reynolds (2006b)
holds that most scenarios we encounter, and their corresponding ethical decisions, are
driven by automatic processes. When discussing the lack of consideration for
information structuring (i.e., X-system functions) among rational models, Reynolds
(2006b) notes, “given that reflexive decision making may be the most common form of
ethical decision making, this omission is quite significant” (p. 741). In addition, while
explaining the great extent to which his model departs from the Rest (1986) tradition,
which considers rational processing preeminent, Reynolds (2006b) notes, “In contrast,
the neurocognitive model suggests that a great deal of ethical decision making is a
process of prototype matching that generates reflexive judgments, and therefore active
judgment may actually be quite uncommon” (p. 741). Indeed, in the workplace, the
prototypical form of sexual harassment involves a male employee, usually in a
supervisory position, harassing a female employee (Stockdale, Visio, & Batra, 1999).
However, there exist less common forms of harassment such as contra-power sexual
harassment (e.g., DeSouza & Fansler, 2003) and cases in which men are the recipients of
sexual harassment (Stockdale et al., 1999; Stockdale, Gandolfo Berry, Schneider, & Cao,
2004). Indeed, of all sexual harassment charges filed to the EEOC from 1992 to 2009,
13.7% were brought by males (86.3% by females). Because these data include same-sex
sexual harassment charges, the prevalence of female-to-male sexual harassment in
organizations must be lower than the value I have presented. At any rate, these less
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common forms of sexual harassment are less likely to be associated with a matching
prototype, and as such, likely require more elaborate processing.
Importantly, Reynolds’s (2006b) model allows for conditions under which the Csystem will be engaged regardless of whether the X-system is able to provide a close
prototype match. The need to justify one’s decision, for example, was proposed to
engage the C-system, such that the X-system would be effectively denied autonomous
control. As Reynolds (2006b) notes in a description of possible experiments,
…participants in the first group would be asked to provide moral justifications for
the two basic decision alternatives…This exercise would engage the higher order
conscious reasoning cycle making those moral arguments available for active
judgment. The second group would not engage in such an exercise, and therefore
their game decisions would be more reflexive in nature. (p. 744)
As such, Reynolds’s (2006b) model is relatively parsimonious, and provides specific
predictions regarding the relationships between the level of conscious processing engaged
during the EDM process, the outcome of the EDM process, and the ethical situation
itself.
Indeed, of the non-rational perspectives described above, Reynolds’s (2006b)
model is perhaps the most comprehensive and parsimonious. In addition, the model
offers many opportunities for empirical testing. Interestingly, the model shares several
features with its related, non-rational, contemporaries. For instance, Sonenshein’s (2007)
sensemaking/construction EDM phase may be explained, analogously, as the operation of
Reynolds’s (2006b) X-system. However, a relative strength of Reynolds’s (2006b)
model in this regard lies in the provision of clear propositions regarding the automaticity
or control of this phase. For instance, one could test this proposition by holding all other
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aspects (e.g., moral intensity) of the ethical issue constant, and varying ethical issue
typicality.
One important feature for the following discussion seems warranted. Specifically,
one must consider the variety of non-rational approaches described above in terms of
dual-process and dual-system models of social cognition that have become popular
within many areas of psychology described earlier. Psychologists have realized great
benefit from the application of such models. In addition, an explanation of this point will
be important for research methods considerations.
Managerial EDM Views through a Social-Cognitive Lens
As described earlier, a central component of the third research question in this
dissertation addresses the extent to which recent models of managerial EDM compare to
contiguous multi-process models found in social-cognitive psychology. To this end, I
assess the value of recent social-cognitive theory to shed light on the links between
automatic and controlled cognitive processes and self-reported and on-line behavior.
Because Reynolds’s (2006b) model is perhaps the most comprehensive of non-rational
managerial EDM models, and because it was not explicitly presented as a socialcognitive model, I will focus on this model. I will start by describing Reynolds’s (2006b)
view of dual-process models, and then describe why his model may or may not fit within
this broader meta-theoretical framework.
Reynolds (2006b) explicitly defined his model as neurocognitive in nature, which,
to be sure, is quite sophisticated. In addition, he purposely distinguished his model from
the dual-process model class of theories by noting that many dual-process theories posit
separate processes operating with different levels of essentially identical content and or
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process. Reynolds is certainly correct in terms of the operating mechanisms of dualprocess models circa 1986 (e.g., ELM; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986), in that the elaboration
likelihood model described the conditions under which more (or less) elaboration, in
essentially the same form, would be applied to a stimulus. However, more recent views
have been developed since that time. Indeed, Smith and DeCoster (2000) presented a
dual-process model which explicitly linked two processing modes to distinct underlying
memory systems, each of which has distinguishable operating and content characteristics.
In fact, by this time, it had become clear to many psychologists that relegating similar
processing styles to multiple systems simply would not do,
Kruglanski et al. (1999) acknowledged that ability and motivation influence the
amount of processing that people carry out, but they held that the type of
processing remains constant…In company with most other dual-process theorists,
we do not find this suggestion compelling. (Smith & DeCoster, 2000, p. 126)
Thus, in general, dual-process models that have appeared more recently have
discontinued the practice of applying multiple processing systems with similar contents
and operating characteristics (e.g., Strack & Deutsch, 2004).
A naming convention regarding multi-process cognitive models within the
psychological literature is worth noting. Some theorists (e.g., Strack & Deutsch, 2004)
have suggested that two separate terms be applied to multi-process models, and this may
help to clarify the issue at hand. As described by Strack and Deutsch (2004), most
modern dual-process models assume distinct operations and content for each process, and
thus, do not differ in this regard. However, the models do differ in terms of when the
processes operate. According Smith and DeCoster (2000) and Strack and Deutsch
(2004), the class of models that allows for the simultaneous operation of automatic and
controlled processes is best termed dual-system, whereas the class suggesting that
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processes occur consecutively or exclusively is best termed dual-process. I follow this
naming convention for the present discussion.
By this rubric, Reynolds’s (2006b) model is herein classified as a dual-system
model, and indeed not a dual-process model. Specifically, because the model accounts
for the simultaneous influence of automatic and controlled processes (i.e., their
interaction on behavior), and proposes two distinct modes of cognition, it meets the
inclusion criteria described above. To elaborate, Reynolds (2006b) directs the reader to
Lieberman, Gaunt, Gilbert, and Trope (2002) for details of the operating characteristics
of the X- and C-system. Lieberman et al., not unlike Strack and Deutsch (2004),
advocate a dual-system approach in which an automatic process is always operating (i.e.,
it is not possible to disengage the process, under any circumstances), and in which a
controlled process may become active under certain conditions. Thus, because the
influence of automatic processes on (concurrent) controlled process is permitted by
Reynolds’s model, it appears to be a dual-system model.
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Chapter 3
Purpose of Present Studies
The aim of this dissertation is to provide a test of existing managerial EDM
models. Specifically, this dissertation addresses three primary research questions, each of
which pertains to the automatic versus controlled EDM debate. The first research
question concerns the extent to which cognitive effort is allocated during the EDM
process. I address this question with an on-line measure of cognitive effort expenditure
during the EDM process, which is an important consideration for managerial settings.
Indeed, as suggested by Chugh (2004), managers are constantly short on cognitive
resources at work, a situation due to distraction and the oversight of multiple concurrent
managerial tasks. As a result, many decisions are made under sub-optimal cognitive
conditions, and these decisions operate by way of qualitatively (and quantitatively)
distinguishable cognitive processes (Chugh, 2004). As Stankov, Fogarty, and Watt
(1989) describe, the quantity of cognitive effort set forth during managerial decisions is a
topic of central importance for scholars of management, “The manager in today’s fastmoving, information-laden environment is likely to be in a position where he has to
divide his attention between a variety of what are sometimes quite diverse projects” (p.
296). Understanding and circumventing the potential cognitive pitfalls (e.g., automatic
decisions that yield unethical outcomes) associated with cognitive processes during EDM
rests on an understanding of such processes (Chugh, 2004).
The second research question addresses whether ethical issue recognition is an
automatic (e.g., non-conscious) process. This question is addressed by applying an
unobtrusive priming method capable of assessing the extent to which information had
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become activated in the participant’s mind. Simply put, I assess whether ethical
recognition occurs without explicitly asking participants. Understanding the process of
ethical issue recognition has great potential impact for management scholars and
practitioners. Indeed, as described earlier, one possible interpretation of the gender effect
in ethical issue recognition, a common finding in the management literature, lies in the
potential for socially desirable responding. Unobtrusive measurement strategies may
circumvent this problem. Recent unobtrusive techniques in sexual harassment research
include the lexical decision task (Yao, Mahood, & Linz, 2010) and tasks similar to the
Implicit Attitude Test (Bargh et al., 1995; Greenwald et al., 1998). The former affords a
measure of ethical issue recognition immune to socially desirable responding. Indeed,
relatively unobtrusive measures like these may provide a more accurate representation of
EDM processing and outcomes (e.g., whistle-blowing, Treviño & Victor, 1992) because
daily organizational life likely excludes the blatant, leading questions that tap ethical
issue recognition in questionnaire research (e.g., Is this an ethical issue?) (Tenbrunsel &
Smith-Crowe, 2008).
Finally, the third research question addresses the extent to which (un)ethical
behavior can be considered as deliberative (i.e., self-reported) and reflexive (i.e.,
automatic), and the extent to which each is related to automatic and controlled cognitive
processes. This question is also important for management scholars and practitioners, as
whether decisions about sexually harassing behavior, and perhaps the behavior itself, is
elicited in a controlled fashion (compared to an automatic fashion) will have wideranging consequences for ethical training methods (Seligman & Kahana, 2009). In
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addition, a demonstration of EDM automaticity may challenge a long-standing view of
EDM as a “completely deliberate and reasoned exercise” (Reynolds, 2006b, p. 737).
By addressing these three research questions regarding (1) the cognitive effort
allocation during EDM with an on-line measure of cognitive effort (e.g., Johnston,
Greenberg, Fisher, & Martin, 1970), (2) the unobtrusive assessment of ethical issue
recognition through a semantic priming procedure (e.g., Fazio, Jackson, Dunton, &
Williams, 1995), and (3) the relationships among automatic attitudes, controlled attitudes,
and sexually harassing behavior (cf. Perugini, 2005), this dissertation provides a
comprehensive account of automaticity and control during EDM related to managerial
issues such as sexual harassment in organizations.
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Chapter 4
Study 1 Rationale
The purpose of Study 1 was to assess how observers of sexual harassment in
organizational settings process varied types of sexual harassment scenarios. I investigate
the extent to which the moral intensity of the issue, the typicality of the ethical issue, and
the requirement to later justify one’s ethical decisions, influence cognitive effort elicited
during the EDM process. Cognitive effort is inferred from performance on a concurrent
secondary task. In this dual-task paradigm, decreasing levels of secondary task
performance indicate that the primary task (e.g., processing a sexual harassment scenario)
consumed cognitive effort, leaving fewer resources available for the secondary task. This
method from cognitive psychology is best understood with an analogy involving an
everyday situation. For example, many individuals speak on cellular telephones while
driving an automobile. Because these tasks (i.e., driving and communicating) require
cognitive resources, one’s pool of resources must be divided between the two tasks, and
the sharing of resources will depend on the relative difficulty of each task. For instance,
one may be able to hold a relatively fluid conversation while navigating an open
highway, but less able to do so while navigating city traffic. In this sense, the efficiency
of the secondary task (i.e., communication) acts as a marker for the resource demands of
the primary task (i.e., driving). Thus, it may be inferred that a communicating driver who
exhibits relatively low comprehension may be navigating heavy traffic conditions (a
relatively difficult primary task).
According to controlled managerial EDM models (Jones, 1991; Street et al.,
2001), as an ethical issue’s moral intensity increases, cognitive effort elicited by the
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EDM process will increase. In contrast, automatic models of EDM (Reynolds, 2006b;
Sonenshein, 2007) posit an automatic ethical issue recognition and judgment phase. As
such, according to the automatic managerial EDM approach, the moral intensity of the
issue should not affect the elicitation of cognitive effort during EDM. Additionally,
automatic EDM views posit an effect of the need to justify ethical decisions, such that
when observers expect this requirement, additional cognitive resources will be elicited.
Controlled EDM views do not provide propositions regarding the influence of the
expectation to justify ethical decisions on cognitive resources elicited. Further, automatic
views of EDM posit that the typicality of ethical issues (i.e., the extent to which it is
common, and thus the extent to which individuals hold a concrete schema about it) will
influence the level of cognitive effort elicited, such that common ethical issues will be
processed automatically, and uncommon issues will elicit increased cognitive effort. In
contrast, controlled EDM views provide no direct propositions regarding the influence of
ethical issue typicality. Finally, controlled EDM views predict that females should
allocate greater levels of cognitive effort toward sexual harassment scenarios that depict
female targets, whereas automatic views predict that females are more likely to maintain
concrete prototypes of sexual harassment, and thus, allocate fewer levels of cognitive
resources. As such, three competing views on cognitive effort expenditure exist. Jones
(1991) and Street et al. (2001) argue for moral intensity, Sonenshein (2007) argues for
complete automaticity (i.e., resource allocation only after a decision is made), and
Reynolds (2006b) argues for typicality and justification need as drivers for cognitive
effort expenditure during EDM. I derive hypotheses regarding the effect of moral
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intensity from the controlled EDM approach, and effects of issue typicality, gender, and
justification requirement from the automatic EDM approach (i.e., Reynolds, 2006b).
Moral Intensity
According to controlled managerial EDM models, moral intensity will directly
influence cognitive effort allocated toward the EDM process. For instance, Street et al.
(2001) suggested that as moral intensity increases, individuals will be increasingly
motivated to allocate greater levels of cognitive effort toward an ethical issue.
Interestingly, Street et al. (2001) noted that Jones (1991) did not provide this proposition
in his influential piece, “Jones’s framework does not address the extent to which the
decision-maker is willing and able to purposely expend cognitive effort in resolving an
ethical issue... [and] does not thoroughly articulate how the moral intensity of the issue
will affect the level of cognitive energy expended by the decision-maker” (Street et al.,
2001, p. 258). Street et al. may be correct in the sense that Jones did not provide a great
deal of detail regarding this effect. However, Jones hypothesized this effect:
…moral reasoning takes time and energy (e.g., gathering facts, applying moral
principles, and making moral judgments [Velasquez, 1982]), it is likely that moral
agents will economize on efforts devoted to moral reasoning when moral stakes
are low. Fiske and Taylor (1984: 146) captured this view well in terms of social
cognition in general: "People dedicate more effort to social understanding when
the stakes are higher. They think more, if not more accurately. (Jones, 1991, p.
384)
A study by Taylor (1975) suggests that the magnitude of consequences of
decisions influences the amount of time and information that a person will bring
to bear on cognitive processes. People may make use of external cues when stakes
are low, but they will rely on self-perception processes more fully when the stakes
are higher. Moral cognitive processes should be similarly affected by this
component of moral intensity. (Jones, 1991, p. 384)
In addition, Jones (1991) suggested that the probability of ethical issue recognition,
which acts as a gatekeeper to the calculative, cognitively expensive judgment process,
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increases with conditions of increasing moral intensity. As such, moral intensity and
cognitive effort allocation are at least indirectly linked in Jones’s theory, if not directly
and explicitly. In sum, these two popular rational approaches to managerial EDM would
predict that moral intensity will positively affect cognitive effort allocated toward the
EDM process.
In contrast, automatic models of EDM (Reynolds, 2006b; Sonenshein, 2007) posit
an automatic ethical issue recognition and judgment phase (analogously, in the rational
approach argot). In this sense, automatic processes guide the interpretation of the
situation, intuition guides the judgment, and a decision is made on the basis of the
intuitive judgment. As such, according to the automatic managerial EDM approach,
provided that certain conditions are not met, which will be described further, the moral
intensity of the issue should not affect the allocation of cognitive effort during EDM. I
derive a hypothesis from the controlled view as follows:
Hypothesis 1. Moral intensity positively influences cognitive effort elicited
during EDM.
Need to Justify
Reynolds (2006b) argued that if a decision-maker is asked (in advance) to provide
a later justification for their decision, then additional cognitive effort will be allocated
toward the decision during the EDM process. Regarding another automatic model,
Sonenshein (2007) likewise proposed that cognitive effort will be allocated toward an
ethical issue only after a decision has been made, or even after the EDM-related behavior
has been enacted, assuming normal conditions (i.e., a prototypical event; low uncertainty;
decision made on an individual basis). According to this view, one may allocate
cognitive effort if asked to justify the decision. However, for Sonenshein (2007), the
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effortful reasoning process should take place only after the decision, “Moral reasoning
serves as a means for individuals to explain/justify their own behavior, but it does not
necessarily cause that behavior; indeed, moral reasoning may even be a consequence of
that behavior” (p. 1027). Thus, Sonenshein’s (2007) model would not predict an effect of
need to justify on the cognitive effort expended during the EDM process itself. However,
Sonenshein’s model does provide one important condition under which the allocation of
cognitive effort would ensue during EDM. This will be treated in the next hypothesis.
Controlled managerial EDM views would not predict an effect of need to justify
on cognitive effort. This is because, according to the controlled approach, moral
reasoning becomes engaged upon the recognition of ethical content (Jones, 1991; Rest,
1986; Street et al., 2001). As such, for issues high in moral intensity, moral reasoning
should be present to a great degree, whether or not justification is required of the
participant. An important clarification is warranted regarding this statement, however.
Specifically, the controlled EDM approaches do make predictions regarding the effect of
personal accountability on cognitive effort. For instance, if a decision-maker was aware
that the eventual decided action was a result of his or her sole decision, then additional
cognitive resources would have been allocated toward the decision (Street et al., 2001).
However, in the case of judging hypothetical instances of unethical behaviors that have
already occurred, or those in which the individual’s response did not represent the final
word regarding the ultimate action, then one must expect that accountability is held
constant at a zero or near-zero level. I derive the following hypothesis from Reynolds’s
(2006b) account.
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Hypothesis 2. Observers expecting to justify ethical decisions, compared to those
who do not expect the need to justify ethical decisions, allocate greater levels
of cognitive effort toward scenarios of sexual harassment in organizations.
Ethical Issue Typicality
Sonenshein’s (2007) and Reynolds’s (2006b) models provide mechanisms
through which the typicality of the ethical issue affects the allocation of cognitive effort,
and these propositions allow for deduction of similar hypotheses. Specifically, Reynolds
proposed that most ethical scenarios would be pattern-matched by the X-system, and
would be further processed by this automatic system. However, if the X-system is unable
to match the scenario to a particular prototype, then it will call upon the C-system to
engage effortful processing for reasons of comprehension. Similarly, although
Sonenshein’s construction phase of EDM is relatively automatic, the presence of
equivocality or uncertainty can lead to conscious reasoning to serve sensemaking during
this phase.
Reynolds (2006b) provided that most ethical issues would be associated with an
underlying prototype in the X-system. However, there are variants of common ethical
issues that are much less common. For instance, within the realm of sexual harassment,
the prototypical form entails a male harasser, often a superior (e.g., supervisor), harassing
a female employee (Stockdale et al., 1999; Stockdale et al., 2004). Indeed, as described
earlier, contra-power and same-sex sexual harassment are much less common than the
prototypical form, but do occur in organizations (e.g., DeSouza & Fansler, 2003). It may
be that many managers have never encountered at least one of these forms of sexual
harassment, and therefore may not maintain X-system prototypes of these behaviors.
One may imagine experimental manipulations in which moral intensity is held constant
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across ethical issues, yet its typicality is varied. It is in this spirit that Hypothesis 3 is
derived.
Controlled accounts of managerial EDM place a relatively heavy emphasis on
moral intensity. This is especially the case for Jones’s (1991) model, which, as described
earlier, is the most influential in the field of management. However, Jones’s model and
its derivatives provide no account of the effect of ethical issue typicality. Indeed,
according to these accounts, if moral intensity is held constant and typicality varied, the
same level of cognitive effort should be allocated to the ethical issue. Again, I derive the
following hypothesis from the automatic view of EDM.
Hypothesis 3. Observers allocate greater levels of cognitive effort toward
scenarios of sexual harassment in organizations when the scenario is atypical (i.e.,
male subordinate harasser; female supervisor target) compared to typical (i.e.,
male supervisor harasser; female subordinate target).
Gender
A great deal of research has investigated the relationship between gender and
ethical judgment and recognition. Interestingly, the automatic and controlled accounts of
managerial EDM offer contrasting predictions regarding its effect for EDM regarding
typical sexual harassment scenarios. Specifically, according to the controlled account,
females would perceive any instance of sexual harassment (in which a female is
harassed) as more morally intense than males. This is because a female participant would
be closer to the victim, a phenomenon Jones (1991) referred to as psychological
proximity, one component of moral intensity. As Franke et al. (1997) noted, “issues
involving an individuals’ own gender are likely to be more proximate than those affecting
the opposite gender” (p. 922). As such, according to the controlled account, females
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should allocate more cognitive effort toward EDM regarding sexual harassment of
females.
Deriving a prediction from the automatic account of managerial EDM is less
clear, but possible, and results in strong and weak forms of the hypothesis. In the strong
form, if EDM is entirely automatic, and if the EDM scenario is common enough for all
participants to hold its prototype in their X-systems, then males and females should
allocate similarly minimal levels of cognitive effort toward managerial EDM scenarios.
The hypothesis relaxes the fully automatic assumption, and proposes that females are
more likely to maintain clear X-system prototypes of female-victim sexual harassment.
This being the case, females should allocate fewer cognitive resources to the ethical
scenario, as their X-systems would be able to process the scenario more readily, a result
perhaps of their increased familiarity with the particular issue. I derive the following
hypothesis from the automatic view, but relax the strong assumption of full automaticity.
Hypothesis 4. Upon viewing scenarios of sexual harassment in organizations,
females allocate lower levels of cognitive effort than males during the EDM
process.
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Chapter 5
Study 1 Method
Participants
A total of 128 students enrolled in undergraduate management courses at the
University of Memphis participated for course extra credit. The studies were approved by
the University of Memphis Institutional Review Board (see Appendix A), and each
participant completed an informed consent form (see Appendix B). As such, I utilized a
non-probability convenience sample. Data from four participants were lost due to
computer errors. The remaining 124 participants (50.00% female) had a mean age of
24.81 (SD = 6.40) years, and a mean of 7.06 (SD = 6.54) years of work experience. The
sample was diverse with regard to ethnicity (33.87% African American; 52.42%
Caucasian American; 13.71% “Other”).
According to Cohen (1992), independent groups comparisons with two levels, α =
.05, and a medium effect (f2 = .25) corresponds with a sample size of 128 for power =.80
[F (1,126) = 3.91]. Effects of attentional demands on prospective time estimates are
often in this range (cf. Block, Hancock, Zakay, 2010). As such, conditions for sufficient
statistical power were met.
Design and Procedure
A laboratory experiment was conducted in which all participants read four
vignettes, each describing an instance of organizational sexual harassment. I manipulated
the moral intensity and typicality of the vignette content within participants, and
manipulated the requirement to justify one’s decisions between participants with random
assignment. As dependent variables, I measured the cognitive effort expended during
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vignette exposure, and participants’ ethical judgments stages per Jones’s (1991) EDM
model.
Design. Vignette moral intensity was varied within subjects. Two of the four
vignettes depicted high moral intensity (i.e., quid pro quo sexual harassment), and two
vignettes depicted low moral intensity (i.e., hostile environment sexual harassment). In
each case, the vignette described a female employee who had experienced sexual
harassment followed by decreased work productivity and anxiety. The scenarios thus
match Fitzgerald, Gelfand, and Drasgow’s (1995) criteria for sexual harassment, and
depict actions that are illegal and often judged to be unethical (e.g., Pierce et al., 2004).
All vignettes appear in Appendix C.
The typicality (i.e., frequency of occurrence in organizations) of the behavior
depicted in the vignette was also manipulated within subjects. To this end, the power
relationship of the harasser and target was varied. Because it is considerably more
common for individuals in supervisory positions to harass those in lower organizational
levels (compared to the reverse, see DeSouza & Fansler, 2003), two vignettes depicting
the former relationship were manipulated as high in typicality, whereas two depicting the
latter reporting relationship were manipulated as low in typicality.
The need to justify one’s ethical decision was varied between subjects with
random assignment to conditions. To this end, half the participants were instructed at the
start of the experiment that they would be required to type a one-paragraph description
rationalizing each of their decisions regarding the scenario. The other half of the
participants received no such instruction.
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The experimental design was thus a 2 (type of organizational sexual harassment:
quid pro quo vs. hostile environment) × 2 (issue typicality: supervisor harasser vs.
subordinate harasser) × 2 (need to justify: yes vs. no) × 2 (participant gender: male vs.
female) mixed model design. Vignette presentation order was randomized across
subjects.
Procedure. The experiment began with computer-aided training on the cognitive
effort assessment task, which terminated after an accuracy criterion was reached,
described further. Participants then read each vignette while simultaneously completing
the cognitive effort task. Next, participants responded to manipulation check items for
vignette moral intensity and typicality. Finally, participants responded to items that
assess ethical issue recognition, ethical judgment, and behavioral intention (cf. Jones,
1991). The entire post-training sequence described above repeated until participants had
responded to all four vignettes.
All responses were collected in a 30-seat computer laboratory with personal
computers running Windows 7. The E-Prime 2.0 Standard software (Schneider,
Eschman, & Zuccolotto, 2002) was used to design the experimental protocol and collect
response data.
Measures
Manipulation checks. As described earlier, it is difficult to assert that a
particular scenario will be viewed as ethical or unethical and typical or atypical by
participants. As such, participants responded to two items to assess perceived moral
intensity and two items designed to assess perceived issue typicality. Items appear in
Appendix D.
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Cognitive effort. While reading each vignette (i.e., the primary task), participants
simultaneously completed a reaction time task (i.e., continuous temporal production; the
secondary task). In the continuous temporal production task, participants pressed the
spacebar on the computer keyboard at the rate of once every three seconds, then pressed
the enter key to indicate that they had completed reading the vignette. Participants were
instructed to focus most of their attention to the primary task, as they would need to
answer questions about the scenario after reading it. According to Brown and colleagues
(1997, 1998, 2006, 2008; Brown & Boltz, 2002; Brown & Merchant, 2007), timing as a
secondary task requires minimal attentional resources, and most frequently exhibits a
pattern of unidirectional interference when paired with concurrent primary tasks of a nontemporal nature. Put differently, temporal productions require so few cognitive resources
that they do not greatly affect simultaneously completed primary tasks, assuming that the
primary task is non-temporal and non-sequential in nature (for reviews, see Block et al.,
2010; Brown, 1997). Conversely, when temporal productions are paired with
simultaneous tasks, the precision and variability of the time estimates suffer to the extent
that the primary task requires increasing cognitive effort. Thus, the interference is
considered unidirectional in nature because timing performance often suffers when paired
with a simultaneous nontemporal primary task, which, in turn, remains mostly
unaffected. In this experiment, cognitive effort was operationalized as the mean temporal
production in seconds (s). Increasing values indicate that a greater level of cognitive
resources was allocated toward the primary task (i.e., processing the scenario), leaving
fewer resources available for timing.
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At the start of the study, participants completed training on the reaction time task.
To this end, participants viewed a stimulus (i.e., ***) at the center of the computer screen
and indicated, with a spacebar press, the point at which they perceived the stimulus to
have been on screen for three seconds. After each keypress, participants received
feedback (e.g., 2.1 Seconds – Too short!; 3.0 Seconds – Great!; 3.9 seconds – too long!)
at the bottom of the screen. To pass the training, participants must have (a) completed at
least 20 keypresses, and (b) the last five time estimates had to have been between 2.5
seconds and 3.5 seconds. While this method may seem unrelated to organizational
settings, similar approaches have been advocated in the management research area (Bing,
LeBreton et al., 2007; Chugh, 2004; Marquardt & Hoeger, 2009). In addition, while
more organizationally relevant concurrent secondary tasks may be conceived of, the
continuous temporal production method employed here affords greater likelihood of an
unidirectional interference pattern, as described earlier.
Demographic data. Information on individuals’ gender, age, years of work
experience, and ethnicity were collected.
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Chapter 6
Study 1 Results
The independent variables were moral intensity (quid pro quo sexual harassment
vs. hostile environment sexual harassment), moral issue typicality (male supervisor
harasser vs. male subordinate harasser), participant decision justification requirement
(present vs. absent), and participant gender (male vs. female). The former two
independent variables were manipulated within participants, and the latter two varied
between participants. Each participant was randomly assigned to a justification
requirement condition, and randomly assigned to receive one of four vignette
presentation orders. The dependent variable was the mean reaction time (i.e., temporal
production) measured in seconds.
Data Reduction
For the reaction time task, participants provided a mean of 15.43 key presses per
vignette at a mean of 4.09 s, making the mean total vignette exposure duration across
conditions 63.11 s. I removed data from six participants who failed to provide at least
one keypress response for two or more of the four conditions (i.e., 50% or more missing
data). I excluded participants’ first key press in each condition (i.e., “warm-up” trial, cf.
Koch, Lawo, Fels, & Vorlander, 2011, p. 3; Perugini, 2005), which reduced the mean
number of button presses to 14.42, and the mean temporal production to 4.03 s. Next,
temporal productions shorter than 500 ms or longer than 10,000 ms (106 keypresses or
1.52% of the data remaining after warm-up trial removal) were removed from all further
analyses, which further reduced the mean number of keypresses per vignette (14.20), and
the mean temporal production (3.90 s). This reaction time outlier approach was chosen in
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lieu of removing individual reaction times based on SD units from condition means
because much more data -11.16% and 7.88%- would have been removed with the 2.5 and
3.0 SD criteria, respectively. In addition, the 2.5 SD approach would have reduced the
mean number of key presses per vignette to 12.81 and the mean production to 3.79 s,
which less accurately represented the original data. Finally, seven participants failed to
provide responses for only one out of the four vignette presentations. In order to avoid
issues of power reduction, values for these seven missing data points were imputed with
the multiple imputation procedure in SPSS 19.0; results with and without the imputation
show the same pattern.
Means and standard deviations for each variable are shown in Table 1. For each
of the four conditions, the dependent variable exhibited positive skew ranging from 0.61
to 0.71 (M = 0.68), each of which was significantly greater than zero according to
Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests of normality. However, standardized skew index (SSI)
values for the dependent variable across the four conditions were all less than 0.001 using
Kline’s (2005) and Malgady’s (2007) SSI formula. The latter approach provides a
standardized result with a range of 2.0 (i.e., 0 ± 1). As such, although the dependent
variable exhibited slight positive skew, I retained the raw reaction time data to facilitate
interpretation.
Manipulation Checks
Two manipulation checks were conducted for vignette moral intensity and
vignette issue typicality. To this end, the mean value of the two items designed to assess
moral intensity perceptions and the two items designed to assess typicality perceptions
were analyzed. Of the 118 analyzable responses, 112 (95%) responded to manipulation
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checks in a manner consistent with the intended manipulation. Results for the six
participants that responded inconsistently were nonetheless retained to prevent power
loss, and to provide a conservative estimate. Participants perceived the high moral
intensity vignettes to be more morally intense (M = 5.48, SD = 1.02) than those of low
moral intensity (M = 4.25, SD = 0.94); t(117) = 16.41, p < .001. In addition, participants
perceived the vignettes of high typicality to be more typical (M = 5.35, SD = 1.22) than
those of low typicality (M = 4.42, SD = 1.34); t(117) = 10.30, p < .001. Taken together,
these findings indicate that the manipulations were effective.
Presentation Order
The possible effect of vignette presentation order was tested with repeated
measures ANOVA with all independent variables entered simultaneously and mean
temporal production as the dependent variable. I failed to detect a main effect of vignette
presentation order on mean reaction time, F (3, 102) = 0.29, p = .835, ηp2 = .01. In
addition, I failed to detect an effect of presentation order in all possible 15 higher-order
interactions (i.e., second through fifth-order) with moral intensity, issue typicality,
justification requirement, and gender.
Hypothesis Tests
Descriptive statistics for the dependent variable in each condition are shown in
Table 1. To test Hypotheses 1-4, reaction time data were submitted to univariate repeated
measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) with the independent variables moral intensity,
issue typicality, justification need, and gender. An ANOVA summary is shown in Table
2.
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Hypothesis 1 proposed that moral intensity would positively affect cognitive
processing, resulting in greater mean temporal productions. I failed to detect a main
effect of moral intensity, F (1, 114) = 3.69, p = .06, ηp2 = .03, however, temporal
productions trended in the predicted direction.
Hypothesis 2 proposed that participants expecting to justify decisions would
allocate increased levels of attention to the scenario, and thus, provide longer temporal
productions. I failed to detect a main effect of justification need, F (1, 114) = 0.47, p =
.49, ηp2 = .00.
Moral intensity and justification need, while not significant main effects,
interacted to predict mean temporal production, F (1, 114) = 4.95, p = .03, ηp2 = .03, such
that the hypothesized effect of moral intensity was present in the justification condition
(M difference = 213.21, SE = 76.40), F (1, 114) = 7.79, p = .006, ηp2 = .06, but not in the
no-justification condition (M difference = 15.65, SE = 68.95), F (1, 114) = 0.05, p = .821,
ηp2 = .00. These findings provide insight into a boundary condition associated with the
effect of moral intensity. A total effects plot is shown in Figure 1, with confidence
intervals calculated according to Jarmasz and Hollands (2009).
Hypothesis 3 proposed that atypical (i.e., subordinate harasser) scenarios of
sexual harassment would elicit greater levels of cognitive processing, and thus, longer
temporal productions. I failed to detect a main effect of issue typicality, F (1, 114) =
0.11, p = .75, ηp2 = .00.
Hypothesis 4 proposed that females would be more familiar with the scenarios
under investigation, and thus, provide shorter temporal productions than males. I
observed a main effect of gender, F (1, 114) = 6.53, p = .01, ηp2 = .05, indicating that
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female participants provided shorter mean productions (M = 3.92, SD = 1.08) than males
(M = 4.40, SD = 1.00). These results provide support for Hypothesis 4.
Issue typicality interacted with gender to predict mean response time, F (1, 114) =
7.59, p < .01, ηp2 = .06, indicating that females provided longer temporal productions in
the typical, compared to atypical scenarios (M difference = 139.89, SE = 62.56), F (1,
114) = 5.00, p = .03, ηp2 = .04. However, the same comparison for males exhibited a
pattern in the opposite direction that failed to reach significance (M difference = 110.34,
SE = 65.89), F (1, 114) = 2.80, p = .10, ηp2 = .02. A total effects plot is shown in Figure
2.
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Table 1
Means and Standard Deviations for Males’ and Females’ Reaction Times by Condition in
Study 1
Males
Females
Justify
No justify
Justify
No justify
(n = 25)
(n = 31)
(n = 28)
(n = 34)
a
Dependent variable
M
SD
M
SD
M
SD
M
SD
1. High intensity; typical 4.51 1.19 4.27 0.92 4.16 1.18 3.91 1.01
2. High intensity; atypical 4.74 1.03 4.34 1.06 3.96 1.11 3.85 1.17
3. Low intensity; typical
4.35 1.36 4.32 0.92 3.93 1.21 3.95 1.21
4. Low intensity; atypical 4.50 1.20 4.31 1.11 3.73 1.48 3.86 1.11
Note. a Mean temporal production (in seconds) for each condition.

Table 2
Univariate Repeated Measures Analysis of Variance for Individuals’ Mean Reaction
Time by Moral Intensity, Issue Typicality, Need to Justify, and Gender in Study 1
Source
Moral intensity (repeated)
Issue typicality (repeated)
Need to justify (independent)
Gender (independent)
Moral intensity × Typicality
Moral intensity × Justify
Moral intensity × Gender
Typicality × Justify
Typicality × Gender
Justify × Gender
Moral Intensity × Justify × Gender
Typicality × Justify × Gender
Moral intensity × Typicality × Justify
Moral intensity × Typicality × Gender
Moral intensity × Typicality × Justify ×
Gender
Error (moral intensity)
Error (typicality)
Error (moral intensity × typicality)
Error (between)
Note. N = 118.
* p < .05. ** p < .01.

df
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

MS
1.136
0.025
2.067
28.630
0.077
1.525
0.001
0.004
1.823
0.747
0.016
0.563
0.003
0.031

1
114
114
114
114

0.002
0.308
0.240
0.301
4.387
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F
3.685
0.106
0.471
6.526*
0.255
4.945*
0.003
0.016
7.585**
0.170
0.052
2.343
0.011
0.103

ηp2
.031
.001
.004
.054
.002
.031
.000
.000
.062
.001
.000
.020
.000
.001

p
.057
.746
.494
.012
.614
.028
.958
.899
.007
.681
.819
.129
.917
.749

0.008

.000

.928

Mean Temporal Production (s)

4.60
4.50
4.40
4.30
4.20
4.10
4.00
3.90
3.80
3.70

Justification
No Justification

Low

High
Moral Intensity

Mean Temporal Production (s)

Figure 1. Mean Temporal Production as a function of moral intensity and need to
justify in Study 1. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals for within/between
repeated measures interaction effects (Jarmasz & Hollands, 2009)
4.60
4.50
4.40
4.30
4.20
4.10
4.00
3.90
3.80
3.70

Male

Female

Atypical

Typical
Issue Typicality

Figure 2. Mean Temporal Production as a function of issue typicality and
participant gender in Study 1. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals for
within/between repeated measures interaction effects (Jarmasz & Hollands, 2009)
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Chapter 7
Study 1 Discussion
The results of Study 1 were consistent with expectations regarding participant
gender. As expected, male participants engaged significantly higher levels of cognitive
effort toward the sexual harassment scenarios, resulting in longer mean temporal
productions. Results were inconsistent with expectations regarding main effects of moral
intensity and justification need on cognitive effort expenditure. However, moral intensity
and justification need interacted such that the hypothesized effect of moral intensity was
observed for participants who expected to later justify their decisions.
Results were also inconsistent with regard to the hypothesized main effect of issue
typicality, which showed no effect on mean temporal productions. However, the most
striking finding was an interaction effect of issue typicality and gender on cognitive effort
expenditure. Specifically, in contrast to the hypothesized effect of issue typicality,
females provided longer mean temporal productions when processing typical (i.e.,
supervisor harasser), compared to atypical (i.e., subordinate harasser), scenarios of sexual
harassment. For males, this effect trended in the opposite and expected direction, but
failed to reach significance. While it may be reasonable to conjecture that high typicality
scenarios were of greater moral intensity, thus resulting in an increase in cognitive effort
expenditure, there two primary reasons why this was likely not the case. First, as
described earlier, the present findings fail to reveal a main effect of moral intensity on
cognitive effort, making an argument for a perhaps more distal proxy of moral intensity
(i.e., typicality) less than compelling. Second, if moral intensity were the culprit, then
one would expect a similar typicality effect pattern for males, which trended in the
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opposite direction. However, one potential explanation for the present finding involves
emotional reaction strength driven by personal relevance (Petty & Brinol, 2008).
Specifically, in the high typicality condition, in which a male supervisor harassed a
female subordinate, a more negative emotional reaction may have been elicited for
females than males. Numerous findings support a relationship between interpersonal
power and the propensity to sexually harass in males (e.g., Bargh et al., 1995). Taken
together with the oft-cited finding that females frequently meet a glass ceiling while
striving to advance to upper organizational echelons, (cf. Lyness & Thompson, 1997),
being harassed by a male supervisor represents a conflict of relatively greater personal
relevance for females compared to males, and thus may elicit a stronger negative
emotional reaction (cf. Petty, Haugtvedt, & Smith, 1995). Further, numerous reports
have demonstrated a relationship between mood state and cognitive effort expenditure,
such that negative mood states elicit greater levels of message processing compared to
positive mood states (Bless et al., 1996). Similarly, Street et al. (2001) argued that
increased levels of personal relevance (i.e., between the observer and the message
content) acts to elicit greater levels of cognitive effort expenditure during message
processing.
How, then, should the results of Study 1be interpreted in light of the theoretical
accounts of the EDM process described in the introduction? At first glance, the lack of a
main effect of moral intensity on cognitive effort expenditure appears to contradict a
popular and long-held account of EDM rooted in the rational perspective and espoused
by Jones (1991). In addition, the lack of a simple main effect of moral intensity within
the no-justification group indicates that moral intensity alone is an insufficient trigger for
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cognitive resource allocation, and thus moral reasoning, as suggested by Jones (1991).
Similarly, the lack of a main effect of justification appears to contradict Reynolds’s
(2006b) EDM model, which proposes that the EDM process is automatic unless
justification expectations are present. Regarding relationships with participant gender,
the present results are compatible with Reynolds’s (2006b) account through X-system
prototype maintenance, but oppose Street et al.’s (2001) account through personal
relevance strength. However, the findings are incompatible with Sonenshein’s (2007)
and Jones’s (1991) account.
The interaction of moral intensity and need to justify allows an alternative and
mixed explanation. EDM may unfold in an automatic or controlled fashion, depending
on characteristics of the decision environment as well as characteristics of the ethical
issue. Specifically, EDM is a primarily automatic enterprise in the absence of
justification requirements. However, when asked to later justify EDM outcomes,
decision-makers do indeed allocate cognitive resources to the ethical issue under
consideration, and the allocation is positively related to the moral intensity of the issue.
As such, it appears that the EDM process may proceed along two cognitive routes, a
position advocated by Street et al. (2001). However, I next turn to address a few caveats.
Worthy of mention is the apparent gatekeeper role played by justification
expectancy. Indeed, gatekeeper functions are not uncommon in EDM theory. According
to Jones’s (1991) account, scenarios of greater moral intensity are more likely to trigger
ethical issue recognition, and thus, greater levels of cognitive resources will be deployed
to diagnose the ethical issue in the remaining three decision stages. As such, the ultimate
impetus of cognitive expenditure for Jones (1991) is moral intensity. The present results
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indicate that this is not the case. Indeed, if it were the case, results would have also
demonstrated an influence of moral intensity on cognitive expenditure within the nojustify condition. Rather, it appears that justification expectancy is the gatekeeper to
EDM processing, and with this condition met, moral intensity may then elicit additional
cognitive resources.
In sum, it appears that some widely-held assumptions about the EDM process
were not supported by the results of Study 1. Most importantly, the classic gatekeeper
function of moral intensity appeared to have little influence on cognitive effort when
participants were not expecting to justify.
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Chapter 8
Study 2 Rationale
The purpose of Study 2 is to assess how observers of sexual harassment in
organizations recognize that ethical issues exist. I evaluate the extent to which sexual
harassment scenarios varying in moral intensity and issue typicality influence unobtrusive
ethical issue recognition. Unobtrusive recognition is inferred with a reaction time-based
semantic priming technique, and allows inferences regarding the automaticity or control
of the ethical issue recognition EDM phase (cf. Jones, 1991). Indeed, a great deal of
debate has surrounded the measurement of ethical issue recognition, the most common
criticism being that asking participants, “does this scenario pose an ethical issue?”
constitutes a priming effect that influences responses (Reynolds, 2006; Treviño, 1992).
This methodological issue has led several researchers to call for alternative measures of
ethical issue recognition (for a review, see Tenbrunsel & Smith-Crowe, 2008).
There are two primary reasons why self-report of ethical issue recognition may be
problematic. First, as described above, it is possible that participants had not seen the
issue as ethical in nature until having been asked, and then consider it so. Second, it is
possible that participants engage in socially desirable responding, and while they may
have not recognized the issue as ethically-relevant, respond in the affirmative after being
explicitly asked about it for self-presentation concerns. Indeed, this may explain some of
the variance regarding the relationship between gender and ethical issue recognition.
Meta-analyses have revealed that females are more likely than males to recognize ethical
issues in the context of sexual harassment (d = .30; Rotundo et al., 2001), and business
practices in general (d = .22, 95% CI = .19/.25; Franke et al., 1997). Further, authors
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have identified relationships between gender and moral orientation (e.g., Jaffee & Hyde,
2000). However, data also indicate that females are more prone to engage in socially
desirable responding in EDM contexts (Chung & Monroe, 2003). It is also possible that
males may recognize the situation as an ethical one, yet fail to report it as such for
motivational reasons, or if he had engaged in such behaviors in the past, and would like
to maintain a positive self-view (cf. Fernandes & Randall, 1992). Therefore, measures
not requiring explicit self-report should be considered. What seems required is a measure
of the extent to which ethically-related concepts become activated in the decision maker,
without asking participants whether this is the case.
If cognitive effort is indeed elicited while processing a sexual harassment
scenario, as suggested by controlled EDM models (Jones, 1991; Street et al., 2001), then
the processing of later, related information should become facilitated (i.e., it should be
processed more quickly relative to unrelated information). This is because effortful
processing of information activates related information for later processing (Neely,
1977). In laboratory contexts, the magnitude of related information processing
facilitation (i.e., priming effect) is based on a comparison of speeded responses (i.e.,
reaction times) to related information (i.e., words related to immorality and sexual
harassment) versus neutral information (i.e., unrelated words) (cf. Hutchison & Bosco,
2007). As such, cognitive effort (i.e., elaboration) elicited by the scenario and later
priming effects should be positively related.
If the EDM recognition process is controlled, then one would expect issues of
greater moral intensity (e.g., quid pro quo sexual harassment) to lead to greater priming
effects than issues of lower moral intensity (e.g., hostile environment sexual harassment).
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In contrast, assuming that sexual harassment scenario typicality is held constant, the
automatic EDM approach (Reynolds, 2006b; Sonenshein, 2007) would predict no effect
of moral intensity on priming effects. In addition, automatic accounts of managerial
EDM propose that increased familiarity with an ethical issue (i.e., its typicality) will
foster its presence and maintenance in the X-system, and thus, allow for automatic EDM
process governance. As such, issue typicality and priming effects should be negatively
related. In contrast, the controlled account would predict a null effect, assuming moral
intensity is held constant, and thus no effect of typicality should be observed on the
priming effect. Finally, as described earlier regarding the automatic approach, it is
possible that females, through their increased familiarity or concern with female-target
sexual harassment scenarios, are more likely to maintain accurate X-system prototypes
(cf. Reynolds, 2006b). This being the case, females should exhibit smaller priming
effects compared to males. In contrast, controlled managerial EDM approaches would
make the opposite prediction through moral intensity, in that females will allocate more
elaboration to the issue, and thus, priming effects should be greater. I derive hypotheses
regarding type of sexual harassment from the controlled approach, and effects of sexual
harassment typicality and gender from the automatic approach.
Moral Intensity
According to the controlled view of managerial EDM, participants should allocate
greater levels of cognitive effort toward ethical issues of greater moral intensity. In this
view, as moral intensity increases, so does the probability of recognizing an ethical issue
as ethically-relevant. However, as described earlier, assuming that the typicality (i.e.,
likelihood of X-system prototype maintenance) is held constant, the automatic approach
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would not predict an effect of moral intensity on recognition of ethical issues as ethical in
nature. I derive the following hypothesis from the controlled managerial EDM view,
Hypothesis 5. Moral intensity is positively related to unobtrusive ethical issue
recognition.
Issue Typicality
As described earlier, automatic accounts of managerial EDM propose that
increased familiarity with an ethical issue (i.e., its typicality) will foster its presence and
maintenance in the X-system, and thus, allow for automatic processing. As such, as issue
typicality increases, so should its governance by the automatic (i.e., X-) system. This
being the case, atypical ethical issues (compared with typical issues) should provide
greater ethics-related stimuli priming effects through its requirements for additional
controlled processing by the C-system. In contrast, the controlled account would predict
a null effect, assuming moral intensity is held constant. I derive the following hypothesis
from the automatic view,
Hypothesis 6. Scenario typicality is negatively related to unobtrusive ethical issue
recognition.
Gender
As described earlier regarding the automatic approach, it is possible that females,
through their increased familiarity or concern with sexual harassment, are more likely to
maintain accurate X-system prototypes. This being the case, females should allocate
fewer cognitive resources toward female-target SH events, and should exhibit smaller
priming effects according to the automatic approach. Controlled managerial EDM
approaches would make the opposite prediction through moral intensity, in that females
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will allocate more elaboration to the issue, and thus, facilitate priming effects of related
information. From the automatic approach, I derive the following hypothesis,
Hypothesis 7. Female participants, compared to male participants, allocate
fewer cognitive resources when observing a sexual harassment in organizations
scenario, thereby resulting in decreased unobtrusive ethical issue recognition.
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Chapter 9
Study 2 Method
Participants
Participants were 140 students enrolled in undergraduate business courses at the
University of Memphis who participated for course extra credit. According to Cohen
(1992), independent groups comparisons with two levels, α = .05, and a medium effect (f2
= .25) corresponds with a sample size of 128 for power =.80 [F (1,126) = 3.91].
Semantic priming effects (e.g., d for related vs. unrelated) are often medium-size effects
(e.g., d = .50, Moss, Ostrin, Tyler, & Marslen-Wilson, 1995; d = .79, Fischler, 1977).
Design and Procedure
As in Study 1, a computer-aided laboratory experiment designed in the E-Prime
2.0 Standard software (Schneider et al., 2002) was conducted in a 30-seat computer
laboratory with personal computers running the Windows 7 operating system. Vignette
materials were identical to Experiment 1 and, thus, moral intensity and issue typicality of
the scenario were manipulated within subjects. The experimental design was thus a 2
(moral intensity: quid pro quo SH vs. hostile environment SH) × 2 (issue typicality:
supervisor harasser vs. subordinate harasser) × 2 (participant gender: female vs. male)
mixed-model design, with four vignette presentation orders randomized across subjects.
As the dependent variable, I measured speeded reaction times to stimuli related and
unrelated to ethics with a lexical decision task.
Participants were told in advance that their memory for the vignette material
would be tested following the presentation of each vignette. This was done to ensure that
participants read the message in the vignette, and to ensure that they held the scenario
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content in memory during the lexical decision task. However, participants were not
aware that the task involved ethical decision-making until the end of the experiment (i.e.,
after all hypothesis-relevant responses were collected). This was done to prevent
unintentional priming.
The experiment began with training on the lexical decision task. To this end,
participants practiced speeded lexical decisions (i.e., word/nonword judgments) to 40
letter strings presented on the computer screen. Participants then read each vignette, after
which they completed a 40-item lexical decision task. Students’ lack of familiarity with
this task is herein seen as a benefit. Indeed, by using such an approach, this experiment is
better able to rule out socially desirable responding concerns, and thus will provide
stronger inferences regarding EDM automaticity. In addition, as described earlier,
similar tasks have been employed in management, and management-related, research
(Bing, Stewart et al., 2007; Frost et al., 2007; Marquardt, 2010; Marquardt & Hoeger,
2009; White & White, 2006; Yao et al., 2010). The vignette-lexical decision task
sequence continued until all four iterations were completed. At the end of the
experiment, the four vignettes were briefly presented again, interspersed with items for
ethical issue recognition, ethical judgment, and ethical intention from Study 1. As
described earlier, these latter responses were collected at the end of the experiment so as
to prevent unintentional priming.
Measures
Unobtrusive ethical issue recognition. The extent to which vignettes activate
ethically-relevant content was assessed with a lexical decision task. The task is based on
findings in the cognitive and social-cognitive psychological literatures that report the
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relatively ubiquitous finding that participants are faster to respond to a stimulus if it is
preceded by a related one. For instance, after having seen the word CAT, participants
will respond to a related word (e.g., DOG) in less time than an unrelated word (e.g.,
PEN). The reaction time difference between related and unrelated/neutral conditions is
referred to as a semantic priming effect. The two most common assessment techniques of
semantic priming effects are pronunciation latencies (i.e., the duration between stimulus
onset and speeded item pronunciation) and lexical decision latencies (i.e., the duration
between stimulus onset and a speeded word/non-word judgment). The lexical decision
task was chosen because it allows for multiple participants to complete the experiment
simultaneously (i.e., without interference from other participants’ pronunciations). This
research method, like implicit measures (e.g., Greenwald et al., 1998), exhibits a lack of
organizational relevance face value. Indeed, as described earlier, this lack of relevance is
beneficial for unobtrusive measures aimed at circumventing response bias. Indeed, the
lexical decision task has been used in sexual harassment research for a similar purpose
(Yao et al., 2010), and procedures with similar underlying characteristics (i.e., including
lexical stimuli) have been previously employed for similar purposes (e.g., Pryor &
Stoller, 1994). Thus, despite its apparent lack of relevance, the task’s strengths lie in the
ability to assess mental processes relevant to managerial ethical decision making while
circumventing socially-desirable responding.
During the lexical decision task, participants pressed the ‘Z’ or ‘2’ key upon
viewing each letter string, which represented the responses of ‘word’ and ‘non-word,’
respectively. Participants were instructed to use the 2 key on the number pad of the
keyboard, and to respond to each letter string as quickly and accurately as possible.
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Feedback was provided following each trial – “CORRECT,” “INCORRECT,” or, if no
response was made within 1000 ms, “NO RESPONSE – PLEASE GO FASTER.”
The 40 stimulus items comprised 20 non-words (e.g., plurch), 10 words related to
ethical / unethical (e.g., illegal), and 10 filler words (e.g., apple). As such, the probability
of encountering a word (vs. non-word) was 0.50, and the probability of encountering an
experimental item (vs. filler item) was 0.50. The LDT task stimuli were identical across
experimental blocks. However, a unique set of 40 items was created for the LDT practice
block. All stimulus items are shown in Appendix E.
Words related to ethical and unethical were selected from the University of South
Florida Free Association Norms (Nelson, McEvoy, & Schreiber, 1998). This database
holds first word that comes to mind responses to over 5,000 English words from over
6,000 participants, and thereby provides an index of semantic relatedness. The selection
of stimuli from this database is common to experimental psychology, and participants’
word response frequencies are closely related to the magnitude of priming effects
observed for cue-target pairs (for examples, see Bengson & Hutchison, 2007; Hutchison
& Bosco, 2007).
Nonwords were generated using the ARC Nonword Database (Rastle, Harrington,
& Coltheart, 2002), and the selected set of 20 closely matched the linguistic
characteristics (e.g., number of letters and syllables) of the experimental and filler items.
In addition, filler items and experimental items were closely matched on number of
letters, syllables, and written word frequency; data for this purpose were drawn from the
MRC Psycholinguistic Database (Coltheart, 1981).
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Chapter 10
Study 2 Results
The independent variables were moral intensity, issue typicality, and gender. The
former two were manipulated within subjects in the same manner as Study 1. The
dependent variable was the magnitude of the priming effect, represented as a d score
comparing related versus unrelated stimuli (see Karpinski & Steinman, 2006). Increasing
values for d are indicative of a stronger priming effect, which, in turn, indicates that
greater activation of ethics-related content occurred. Data were submitted to univariate
repeated measures ANOVA, as shown in Table 4. Means and standard deviations for
each condition are shown in Table 3. None of the variables exhibited skew greater than
0.20.
The possible effect of vignette presentation order was tested with repeated
measures ANOVA with all independent variables for the study entered simultaneously,
and reaction time d score as the dependent variable. I failed to detect a main effect of
vignette presentation order on mean reaction time, F (3, 138) = 0.12, p = .95, ηp2 = .00, as
was the case for all possible higher-order interactions (i.e., second through fourth-order)
with moral intensity, issue typicality, and gender. In addition, because Study 2 and Study
3 were conducted concurrently, I tested for the impact of Study 2 and Study 3
participation order. To this end, an additional dichotomous predictor was added to the
analysis described above, which yielded the same pattern of results as follows: no
significant main effect of study order, F (1, 138) = 1.77, p = .19, ηp2 = .01, and no higherorder interaction with study order reached significance.
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Data Reduction
I computed d scores following a procedure similar to Karpinski and Steinman’s
(2006). This approach is suitable for comparing reaction times associated with related
and unrelated conditions, and is calculated as the mean difference between conditions
divided by the standard deviation of all correct responses. Incorrect responses were
discarded from the analysis, and response times under 350 ms were removed (see
Karpinksi & Steinman, 2006).
Hypotheses Tests
Hypothesis 5 proposed that vignette Moral Intensity would positively influence
priming effects. I failed to detect a main effect of moral intensity on priming effects, F
(1, 138) = 0.00, p = .996, ηp2 = .00.
Hypothesis 6 proposed that vignette Issue Typicality would negatively affect
priming effects, because atypical scenarios recruit additional processing, thus resulting in
greater priming effects. I observed support for Hypothesis 6, F (1, 138) = 3.99, p = .048,
ηp2 = .00.
Hypothesis 7 proposed that Gender would be related to priming effect magnitude
such that males would exhibit a greater priming effect due to their increased message
processing relative to females. I observed support for Hypothesis 7, F (1, 138) = 5.87, p
= .017, ηp2 = .04.
As in Study 1, I observed an issue typicality by gender interaction, F (1, 138) =
4.75, p = .031, ηp2 = .03, again with no simple main effect of issue typicality for male
participants (MD = 0.01, SE = 0.05, F (1, 138) = 0.02, p = .891, ηp2 = .00). Rather, the
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interaction was driven by the simple main effect for female participants (MD = 0.17, SE =
0.06, F (1, 138) = 7.83, p = .006, ηp2 = .05), indicating that, in contrast to the finding in
Study 1, priming effects were greater for atypical scenarios as predicted in Hypothesis 7.
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Table 3
Means and Standard Deviations for Males’ and Females’ Reaction Time d Scores by Condition in
Study 2

Females
Males
(n = 61)
(n = 78)
Dependent variable a
M
SD
M
SD
1. High intensity; typical
0.01
0.52
0.17
0.44
2. High intensity; atypical
0.17
0.49
0.16
0.50
3. Low intensity; typical
-0.03
0.49
0.20
0.46
4. Low intensity; atypical
0.15
0.42
0.19
0.51
Note. a Mean d score comparing related and unrelated
conditions.

Table 4
Univariate Repeated Measures Analysis of Variance for Individuals’ Mean Reaction
Time d Score by Moral Intensity, Issue Typicality, and Gender in Study 2
Source
Moral intensity (within)
Issue typicality (within)
Gender (between)
Moral intensity × Typicality
Moral intensity × Gender
Typicality × Gender
Moral intensity × Typicality × Gender
Error (moral intensity)
Error (typicality)
Error (moral intensity × typicality)
Error (between)
Note. N = 139.
* p < .05.

df
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
138
138
138
138
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MS
0.000
0.920
1.431
0.007
0.118
1.097
0.008
0.189
0.231
0.258
0.244

F
0.000
3.986*
5.874*
0.026
0.622
4.750*
0.029

ηp2
.000
.028
.041
.000
.004
.033
.000

p
.996
.048
.017
.873
.432
.031
.864

0.30

Male

0.25

Female

Priming d score

0.20
0.15
0.10
0.05
0.00
-0.05

-0.10

Atypical

Typical
Issue Typicality

Figure 3. Mean reaction time d score as a function of issue typicality and
participant gender in Study 2. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals for
within/between repeated measures interaction effects (Jarmasz & Hollands, 2009).
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Chapter 11
Study 2 Discussion
Results of Study 2 were consistent with predictions regarding relationships with
issue typicality and gender, but inconsistent with predictions regarding moral intensity.
The dependent variable in Studies 1 and 2 may be interpreted similarly. Specifically, just
as increasing mean values for temporal productions indicate increased cognitive effort
allocation with an on-line assessment, increasing priming effect values are indicative of
related content activation, which in turn, may be due to increased levels of cognitive
expenditure during vignette exposure. At any rate, the magnitude of the priming effect
indicates the extent to which ethics-related content became activated in the participant.
Regarding the effect of issue typicality, I observed a main effect in the predicted
direction such that atypical sexual harassment scenarios resulted in greater priming than
typical scenarios. Regarding the relationship with gender, results indicated that, overall,
males exhibited greater priming than females, as predicted in Hypothesis 6. This latter
finding is compatible with the results of Study 1.
The lack of a main effect of moral intensity is not surprising provided the results
of Study 1, in which the effect of moral intensity was present for only the ‘justification’
condition. Indeed, none of the participants in the present study were given justification
instructions. As described earlier, this was done to more closely evaluate the preresponse cognitive environment of the EDM process (often referred to as recognition).
Not unlike Study 1, the most striking finding in Study 2 is an interaction effect of
issue typicality and gender on priming effect magnitude. Comparing the present results
to the results of Study 1, I again detected a significant simple main effect of typicality for
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females, and again failed to observe a simple main effect of typicality for males.
However, opposite to the pattern observed in Study 1, females exhibited greater priming
effects for atypical, compared to typical scenarios.
The results of Study 2 demonstrate that moral intensity failed to influence an
unobtrusive measure of ethical issue recognition. While this is a null effect, and thereby
less than satisfying, it is worth noting that the same lack of effect was observed among
Study 1 participants who did not expect to later justify decisions. In fact, the significant
simple main effect of moral intensity within the justification condition in Study 1 was
derived from fewer participants than the non-significant effect in the no-justification
condition, leaving less than adequate statistical power an unlikely conjecture. This
finding is again potentially troublesome for Jones’s (1991) account of the EDM process,
in which moral intensity and ethical issue recognition play crucial roles.
Regarding the observed relationship with participant gender, the present findings
also support relatively automatic accounts of the EDM process. Specifically, the finding
that females exhibited overall lower priming magnitudes than males can be interpreted in
light of Reynolds’s (2006b) view of EDM, in that females allocate fewer cognitive
resources because they maintain stronger cognitive prototypes with which to process the
scenario. However, the present results are incompatible with Jones’s (1991) viewpoint,
which predicts the opposite pattern because of females’ increased perception of moral
intensity, and thus, increased cognitive expenditure.
The observed simple main effect of issue typicality is also well-explained by
Reynolds’s (2006b) EDM account, but not by other EDM views. According to
Reynolds’s (2006b) view, less common events should be less likely to have a strong
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representation in the X-system, thus requiring additional resources for processing.
However, the lack of a simple main effect for males is perplexing. One possible
explanation for the pattern of results shown in Figure 3 is that the typical harassment
scenario is so familiar to females that it requires significantly fewer resources to process
for them compared to all other harassment scenarios when viewed by males and females.
Overall, results of Study 1 and Study 2 provide insight into the underlying
cognitive processes that precede (un)ethical behavior. Specifically, Study 1 addressed
the extent to which observers allocate cognitive effort toward organizational sexual
harassment scenarios varying in moral intensity and issue typicality. Study 2 addressed
the extent to which the scenarios used in Study 1 activate ethics-related concepts in
observers. Study 3 is designed to address a similar yet distinct question regarding EDM
automaticity. However, Study 3 extends the influence of automatic and controlled
cognitive antecedents to the behavioral arena. Specifically, as described next, Study 3
aims to address the extent to which automatic and controlled cognitive representations
influence self-reported and on-line sexually harassing behavior.
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Chapter 12
Study 3 Rationale
The purpose of Study 3 is to assess the extent to which markers of automatic
(implicit attitudes) and controlled (explicit attitudes) cognition covary with on-line and
self-reported sexually harassing behaviors. As described earlier, a great deal of
psychological research in this stream has revealed that (a) implicit and explicit attitudes
are distinct constructs, (b) on-line and self-reported behaviors are distinct constructs , (c)
implicit attitudes better predict on-line behavior than self-reported behavior, and (d)
explicit attitudes better predict self-reported behavior than on-line behavior (see Perugini,
2005). This realization has great potential impact for organizational research, as it
suggests that what we say we do and what we actually do are different constructs. To this
end, implicit and explicit attitudes toward sexual harassment are assessed, and on-line
and self-reported behavior is assessed.
Bargh et al. (1995) found that participants’ implicit attitudes (i.e., an automatic
powersex association) were related to scores on Pryor’s (1985) likelihood to sexually
harass scale. However, this study did not assess different forms of behavior (i.e., selfreported and on-line). Perhaps the most revealing demonstration in this stream, as
described earlier, was conducted by Perugini (2005), who found that an implicit measure
of snack food preference best predicted the snack food participants actually choose,
whereas an explicit measure of snack food preference best predicted what participants
claim (i.e., self-report) to consume. Indeed, conceptually similar results have been found
in managerial EDM contexts. As Treviño (1992) noted regarding Hessing, Elffers, and
Weigel’s (1988) tax evasion study that assessed self-reported and actual tax evasion
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behavior, self-reported attitudes predicted only self-reported tax evasion, however, only
individual difference variables (e.g., personality) predicted actual tax evasion.
Psychologists have proposed several competing views regarding the influence of
automatic and controlled cognition on on-line and deliberative behavior. Perugini (2005)
delineated three competing predictions regarding these effects, and they are applied
herein. According to Perugini, implicit and explicit attitudes may be separate constructs,
each corresponding to its own underlying memory system (see Smith & DeCoster, 2000;
Wilson, Lindsey, & Schooler, 2000). In addition, these views propose that implicit
attitudes drive on-line behavior, whereas explicit attitudes are primarily responsible for
driving deliberative behavior. Accordingly, this class of models predicts a doubledissociative pattern such that implicit attitudes will predict on-line behavior, and explicit
attitudes will predict deliberative behavior.
If the EDM process is controlled, as provided by controlled views of EDM (Jones,
1991; Street et al., 2001), then explicit, but not implicit, attitudes toward sexual
harassment should be related to self-reported and on-line behavior. In contrast, if the
EDM process is automatic in nature (Sonenshein, 2007), then implicit attitudes, but not
explicit attitudes, toward sexual harassment should predict on-line and self-reported
behavior. Finally, if the EDM process involves a combination of automatic and
controlled cognitive components (Reynolds, 2006b), then implicit and explicit attitudes
toward sexual harassment in organizations should have an additive or interactive
relationship with on-line and self-reported behavior. I derive the following two
hypotheses regarding the relationships of implicit and explicit attitudes toward sexual
harassment from Perugini and Leone’s (2009) double-dissociative pattern:
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Hypothesis 8. Explicit attitudes toward sexual harassment in organizations are
positively related to self-reported sexually harassing behavior.
Hypothesis 9. Implicit attitudes toward sexual harassment in organizations are
positively related to on-line sexually harassing behaviors.
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Chapter 13
Study 3 Method
Participants
Participants were 142 students enrolled in undergraduate business courses at the
University of Memphis who participated for course extra credit. According to Cohen
(1992), a significant correlation coefficient, α = .05, and a medium effect (r = .30)
correspond with a sample size of 85 for power = .80. A recent meta-analysis by
Greenwald et al. (2009) revealed an average r = .27 for the relationship between implicit
attitudes and various outcomes, and an average r = .36 for explicit attitudes. As such,
conditions for sufficient statistical power were met.
Design and Procedure
Participants completed all measures in the same laboratory setting described in
Study 1 and Study 2. The order of tasks – IAT, explicit attitude, self-reported behavior,
and online behavior-- was randomized across participants. After completing these four
tasks, participants completed a demographic information questionnaire. The experiment
involved one between-subjects variable, participant gender.
Measures
Explicit attitudes toward sexual harassment. Self-reported attitude toward
sexual harassment was assessed with a scale developed by Mazer and Percival (1989). In
their review of attitudinal measures of sexual harassment, Lonsway, Cortina, and Magley
(2008) noted that this scale had acceptable psychometric properties (α = .84). In the
present sample, the scale with all 19 items demonstrated acceptable internal consistency
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(α = .81). Participants responded to each of 19 items on a 1 to 5 scale (1 = strongly
disagree, 5 = strongly agree). Items for this scale can be found in Appendix K.
Implicit attitudes toward sexual harassment. A single category implicit
association test (SC-IAT) was developed according to the procedure described by
Karpinski and Steinman (2006). Beneficially, the SC-IAT does not require a contrast
category, and thus allows for assessments of attitude objects for which an opposing
category is unclear. The SC-IAT is a technique used to assess automatic associations
between attitude objects, which may be events, individuals, images, words, or virtually
any stimulus or idea (cf. Fazio et al., 1986). During trials, participants rapidly classified
pictures and words into one of two categories. Specifically, participants were told to
expect an I like word (e.g., HAPPY), an I don’t like word (e.g., FEAR), or an image of
employees interacting in a work environment (i.e., images of sexual harassment), to be
presented on the computer screen, one at a time. Their task was to categorize each
stimulus into one of two categories as quickly and accurately as possible. In the first
experimental block, participants categorized positively-valenced words and images of
sexual harassment into the I like category, and negatively-valenced words into the I don’t
like category. The second experimental block’s procedure was identical, however, in this
block, images sexual harassment were instead categorized into the I don’t like category.
By comparing SC-IAT blocks, a reaction time based d score representing one’s
automatic association strength is derived. For instance, if a participant is able to more
quickly categorize images of sexual harassment into the I like category compared to the I
don’t like category, then a relatively strong association between positive valence and
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sexual harassment (i.e., an overall positive implicit attitude of opposite sex organizational
members being harassed) is said to exist.
The SC-IAT included images of males sexually harassing females at work (seen
by male study participants), females sexually harassing males at work (seen by female
participants), pleasant words, and unpleasant words. Care was taken to ensure that the
images were not revealing so as to prevent discomfort on the part of the research
participant. For instance, most images depicted shoulder-rubbing with an apparently
unwilling recipient.
The IAT’s reliability was assessed according to Karpinski and Steinman (2006).
Specifically, for the present data, the 72 post-practice trials were spilt into three sets of 24
items each, and the mean RT difference score between conditions was calculated. The
mean inter-correlation among the three sets of 24 items (r = .68) was submitted to the
Spearman-Brown correction formula, which resulted in an acceptable adjusted value (24
 72 items: r = .87). According to Karpinski and Steinman (2006), the resulting
Spearman-Brown correlation is directly comparable with the Chronbach’s alpha
coefficient. All images are shown in Appendix I, and all SC-IAT word stimuli are shown
in Appendix J.
On-line behavior. The purpose of an on-line measure of harassing behavior is to
assess what individuals actually do when paired with opposite-sex organizational
members. In modern social-psychological research, its contrast with self-reported
behavior frequency or intention is common (Perugini, 2005; Perugini & Leone, 2009;
Richetin et al., 2007). Two computer harassment methods have been developed by
researchers to assess on-line sexually harassing behavior. The first, developed by Maass,

97

Cadinu, Guarnieri, and Grasselli (2003), pairs participants with research confederates and
assesses their willingness to transmit pornographic images to them via computer.
Because this method may be unacceptable to participants and institutional review boards,
I used a milder version of the computer harassment technique. Specifically, Siebler et al.
(2008) modified Maass et al.’s (2003) procedure by replacing pornographic images with
sexist jokes, the sending of which also constitutes sexual harassment if viewed as
unwelcome by recipients (Siebler et al., 2008). In this paradigm, participants were led to
believe that they were communicating with a person of the opposite sex by computer
chat. However, all communication with this hypothetical message recipient is preprogrammed. During the simulated communication (see Appendix H), the participant
made a series of forced-choice decisions regarding which of two jokes (one harassing and
one non-harassing) to send to the recipient. Jokes were pilot-tested (see Appendix F) to
ensure that each pair was matched in funniness, and that each pair contained only one
joke rated high in sexual harassment potential. All jokes are listed in Appendix G.
Self-reported behavior. A modified version of the sexual experiences
questionnaire (SEQ; Fitzgerald et al., 1995) was administered. The scale is best
characterized as a measure of past experience being the target of sexually harassment.
However, the 17-item scale was modified to assess the frequency of past engagement in
sexually harassing behavior (e.g., Have you ever been sexually harassed? was modified
to Have you ever sexually harassed another?), and were responded to on a 1 to 5 scale (1
= never, 5 = most of the time).
Because approximately half of the participants in the experiment were female,
items were worded such that gender-neutral terms appeared (e.g., opposite sex) in place
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of gender words (e.g., woman; female). This allowed the measurement of sexual
harassment behaviors of males, as well as females. In the present sample, this measure
demonstrated acceptable internal consistency (α = .79). Items are reported in Appendix L.
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Chapter 14
Study 3 Results
Data Scoring and Preparation
The on-line measure of sexually harassing behavior was operationalized as the
number of sexually harassing jokes sent by participants. As participants made eight
forced-choices between sexually harassing and neutral jokes, the total score ranged from
zero to eight. Importantly, Siebler et al. (2008) argued that analyses conducted with this
measure might be done in two ways – with and without the first harassing joke sent
included in the sum. This is because one criterion of sexual harassment involves
awareness that the message or behavior recipient finds the content offensive. As such, it
could be argued that the first harassing joke sent could be perceived as harassing or not,
depending on how the joke recipient reacted to it. Regardless, before the first joke was
responded to, one could argue that no sexual harassment exists (Siebler et al., 2008). To
remedy this concern, both operationalizations of on-line sexually harassing behavior are
included in Table 5. In addition, I follow McCabe and Hardman (2005) by including in
Table 5 explicit attitude toward sexual harassment with and without Mazer and Percival’s
(1989) item 12, which pertains to an educational, rather than organizational, setting (i.e.,
instructor-student relationship). However, as none of these operationalization choices
substantively affected the findings, further analyses include the on-line behavior with all
jokes, and the attitudinal measure with all items.
Hypotheses Tests
Means, standard deviations, zero-order correlations, and reliability estimates are
shown in Table 5. Table 8 contains parameter estimates for the hypothesized model
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shown in Figure 4, for which I observed acceptable levels of fit (χ2 = 0.56(3); χ2/df =
0.19; NFI = .98; IFI =.99; TLI = .99; CFI = .99; RMSEA = .00). As shown in Table 8,
estimating the covariance between the error terms of the two dependent variables did not
significantly improve model fit (Δ χ2 = -0.47, df = 1, p > .05) and, accordingly, all further
analyses omit its estimation.
Hypothesis 8 predicted a positive relationship between explicit attitudes toward
sexual harassment and self-reported behavior. I observed support for this hypothesis (β =
.29, p < .001). Hypothesis 9 predicted a positive relationship between implicit attitudes
toward sexual harassment and on-line sexually harassing behavior. I observed a
significant, positive relationship, (β = .19, p = .022), thus supporting Hypothesis 9. In
addition, explicit attitudes were not significantly related to on-line behavior (β = .00, p
>.05), and implicit attitudes were not significantly related to self-reported behavior (β = .02, p >.05). Taken together, I observed results matching Perugini’s (2005) doubledissociative pattern. However, Perugini (2005) provided two alternative hypotheses
regarding this pattern. To further characterize the relationships among the study
variables, I conducted analyses to assess whether the relationships demonstrate an
additive, interactive, or double-dissociative pattern (Perugini, 2005).
Perugini’s (2005) first alternative pattern, the additive pattern, predicts an increase
in criterion variance explained from the addition of the alternative attitudinal predictor.
Stated differently, an additive model would predict that regressing either criterion on both
attitudinal predictors will provide incremental variance explained beyond any single
predictor alone. I tested Perugini’s (2005) hypothesis with two sets of analyses. First, I
tested an alternative path model (Model 3 in Table 8), in which I added paths for implicit
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attitude  self-reported behavior and explicit attitude  on-line behavior. This
alternative model did not significantly improve model fit beyond the hypothesized model
(Δ χ2 = -0.08, df = 2, p > .05). In addition, both added paths were non-significantly
related to the study criteria (βs < |.03|, ps > .05). I also tested this hypothesis by
conducting two hierarchical regression analyses, shown in Table 6 for self-reported
behavior, and Table 7 for on-line behavior. In each case, regressing the criteria on the
additional attitudinal predictor did not provide incremental variance explained (Fs <
0.10). As such, I did not obtain support for Perugini’s (2005) additive hypotheses.
Perugini’s (2005) final alternative pattern, the interactive pattern, predicts that
implicit and explicit attitudes interact to predict behavior. I tested this hypothesis again
with two techniques. First, I estimated model fit change by adding a mean-centered
interaction term (implicit attitude × explicit attitude), as well as its paths to self-reported
and on-line behavior, to Model 1. As shown in Table 8, the addition of the interaction
term and two paths did not significantly improve model fit (Δ χ2 = -0.09, df = 2, p > .05).
In addition, both added paths were non-significantly related to the study criteria (βs <
|.05|, ps > .05).
I also tested the interactive pattern with hierarchical regression analyses, shown in
Table 6 for self-reported behavior, and Table 7 for on-line behavior. Step 3 in each table
shows that the addition of the interaction term did not provide significant incremental
variance explained for either dependent variable (Fs < 0.27). As such, I did not obtain
support for Perugini’s (2005) interactive hypotheses.
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Figure 4. Hypothesized Model for the Relationships among Implicit Attitude and Explicit
Attitude toward Sexual Harassment, Self-reported Sexually Harassing Behavior, and Online Sexually Harassing Behavior in Study 3.
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Table 5
Means, Standard Deviations, Correlations, and Reliability Estimates for all Variables in Study 3
Variable
M
SD
1
2
3
4
5
1. Explicit attitude toward SH
72.51 16.49
.81a
2. Implicit attitude toward SH
-0.19 0.50
.20*
.87b
3. Self-reported SH behavior
21.78 4.73
.29*
.04
.79 a
4. On-line SH behavior
1.29 1.06
.04
.19*
.06
5. Subject genderc
1.56 0.50
.43** .09
.18*
-.11
a
b
Note. N = 139-140. Chronbach’s alpha. Average intercorrelation among test thirds with Spearman-Brown
correction (see Karpinski & Steinman, 2006) . c1 = Female, 2 = Male.
*p < .05. **p < .01.

Table 6
Summary of Hierarchical Regression Analysis for Variables Predicting Self-reported SH Behavior in Study 3
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Variable
B
SE B
β
B
SE B
β
B
SE B
β
Explicit attitude toward SH
.08
.02
.29
.09
.02
.30
.08
.02
.29
Implicit attitude toward SH
-.24
.84 -.02 -.28
.85 -.03
Explicit × Implicit
-.24
.47 -.04
2
R
.08
.09
.09
F for change in R2
12.40**
0.08
0.26
Note.
*p < .05. **p < .01.
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Table 7
Summary of Hierarchical Regression Analysis for Variables Predicting On-line SH Behavior in Study 3
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Variable
B
SE B
β
B SE B
Β
B
SE B
Β
Implicit attitude toward SH
.45
.19 .20 .46
.19
.21 .46
.19
.21
Explicit attitude toward SH
.00
.01 -.01 -.00
.01 -.01
Implicit × explicit attitude
-.02
.11 -.01
R2
.04
.04
.04
2
F for change in R
5.82*
0.01
0.02
Note. N = 142. SH = Sexual harassment.
*p < .05. **p < .01.

Table 8
Chi-square Difference Tests Between Theoretical Model and Alternative Models, Standardized Path Coefficients, and Model
Fit Indices in Study 3
Model: Paths added or removed
χ2 (df)
Δ χ2 (df)
β
RMSEA NFI
RFI
IFI TLI
CFI
Model 1: Hypothesized model
0.56 (3)
.00
.98
.92
.99 .99
.99
Model 2: add SRB and OLB disturbance
covariance

0.09 (2)

0.47 (1)

Model 3: add EA→OLB
add IA → SRB

0.48 (1)

0.08 (2)

-.01
-.02

.00

.99

.98

.99

.99

.99

.00

.98

.80

.99

.99

.99

Model 4: add EA→OLB
0.47 (1)
0.09 (2)
-.01
.00
.98
.73
.99 .99
.99
add IA→SRB
-.03
add IA × EA → SRB
-.04
add IA × EA → OLB
-.01
Note. N = 142. Models 2-4 compared to Model 1. EA = Explicit attitude; IA = Implicit attitude; OLB = On-line behavior;
SRB = Self-reported behavior.
* p < .05.
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Chapter 15
Study 3 Discussion
Results of Study 3 support Hypotheses 8 and 9. Specifically, I observed positive
relationships between explicit attitude toward sexual harassment and self-reported
behavior, as well as between implicit attitude and on-line sexually harassing behavior.
Interestingly, taken at face value, these results are compatible with automatic and
controlled accounts of EDM. After all, explicit attitudes did indeed predict self-reported
behavior, and implicit attitudes did indeed predict on-line behavior. However, a rather
important caveat is worth exploring. Specifically, while explicit attitudes toward sexual
harassment were significantly related to self-reported sexually harassing behavior, it was
unrelated to on-line behavior (i.e., actual behavior). Likewise, implicit attitudes toward
sexual harassment were related to on-line sexually harassing behavior, but not related to
self-reported behavior. These findings are compatible with Perugini et al.’s (2005)
double-dissociative pattern, and beg the following question: In an organizational setting,
which is the ultimate criterion of interest?
The question is admittedly rhetorical. Indeed, management researchers often use
self-reported behavior as a proxy for actual behavior. Thus, that actual (i.e., on-line)
behavior must be of greater value to researchers and practitioners is a reasonable
conjecture. The use of self-reported behavior is not uncommon to assessments of task
performance (Meyer, 1980), organizational citizenship behaviors, and counter-productive
behaviors, just to name a few research areas within human resource management and
organizational behavior.
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Taken together, results of Study 3 strongly support an automatic, and not
controlled, view of ethical behavior. Indeed, with on-line behavior as the criterion of
interest, automatic (i.e., implicit), but not controlled (i.e., explicit), attitudes predicted
sexually harassing behavior. Specifically, lack of support for the additive and interactive
patterns leave the observed pattern relatively unambiguous. Briefly, sexually harassing
behaviors actually enacted by participants were predicted only by implicit attitudes,
whose influence on behavior is primarily automatic, and not by explicit attitudes, whose
influence on behavior is primarily controlled (for reviews, see Smith & DeCoster, 2000;
Strack & Deutsch, 2004).
This pattern of findings is again troubling for controlled EDM views.
Nevertheless, to revive the caveat mentioned above, it is possible that the wide array of
support for rational EDM models (for reviews, see Ford & Richardson, 1994; KishGephart et al., 2010; Loe et al., 2000; O'Fallon & Butterfield, 2005) is present perhaps
because it has been tailored to fit a relatively poor --and likely deficient and
contaminated-- indicator of behavior. Stated differently, one might rightly expect explicit
attitudes, behavioral intentions, and self-reported behaviors (common variables in the
rational EDM tradition) to be closely related, as they are in many areas of behavioral
science. Arguably, a more stringent test of any theoretical model in organizational
behavior or human resource management is provided when actual behavior, and not its
proxy, is used as a criterion.
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Chapter 16
General Discussion
In three studies, I investigated the extent to which decisions about sexual
harassment in organizations are related to automatic and controlled cognitive processes.
Across the three studies, the pattern of findings is generally consistent with an automatic
or mixed cognitive process account of the EDM process, and inconsistent with a
controlled cognition account. Indeed, recent work on EDM suggests that the underlying
cognitive processes that give rise to ethical decisions and behavior are best characterized
as automatic in nature (Reynolds, 2006; Reynolds et al., 2010; Sonenshein, 2007).
However, evidence related to this general proposition within the realm of organizational
behavior is scant.
An in-depth understanding of the ethical decision-making process is a necessary
step for tackling ethical behavior concerns not only within organizations, but also at their
interface with the public at large. The studies reported in this dissertation shed light on
the underlying cognitive processes involved in the EDM process. The results of Study 1
indicate that cognitive processing is related to moral intensity only when individuals are
expecting to justify their decisions. This is an important boundary condition, as explicit
justification requirements likely exist less frequently in daily organizational life
compared to laboratory settings. Results of Study 1 are consistent with Reynolds’s
(2006b) proposition regarding prototype matching, as evidenced by the relationship
between participant gender and cognitive effort expenditure. Indeed, Jones’s (1991) and
Street et al.’s (2001) models predict that females should allocate greater cognitive effort
than males, which is a pattern opposite to that hypothesized, observed, and consistent
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with Reynolds’s (2006b) and Sonenshein’s (2007) models. Finally, the unexpected
interaction effect between issue typicality and gender on cognitive effort expenditure,
while not well-understood through a controlled EDM lens, could be explained through an
affective reaction mechanism. As described earlier, the modal theoretical viewpoint
regarding the influence of affective processes on cognitive outcomes (e.g., decisions,
evaluations) is automatic in nature (e.g., Forgas, 1995). As such, although the present
findings do not allow a concrete explanation for the unexpected interaction, the findings
are still compatible with an automatic, but not a controlled, cognitive process account.
While Study 1 assessed the amount of cognitive effort elicited by sexual
harassment ethical issues, Study 2 had a narrower scope of investigation to perhaps the
most critical element of Jones’s (1991) and Street et al.’s (2001) models: ethical issue
recognition. As described earlier, one prominent shortcoming of the controlled cognition
account lies in how ethical issue recognition is assessed – with explicit survey-based
responses. However, as findings in psychology have shown, responses elicited through
explicit techniques provide relatively poor prediction of on-line behavior compared to
that provided by implicit responses (Perugini, 2005). In addition, provided that ethical
issue recognition plays such an essential gatekeeper role in controlled EDM views, a
crucial test of this controlled model was warranted.
The results of Study 2 are better explained by an automatic, not controlled,
account of the EDM process. I observed relationships between (a) issue typicality and
recognition, (b) gender and recognition, but not (c) moral intensity and recognition.
Again, the observed pattern is consistent with the automatic EDM view. Together, these
results indicate that, contrary to a widely-held account, ethical issue recognition, and
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perhaps the remainder of the process, is not influenced by perceived moral intensity, but
instead by factors proposed by automatic ethics theories (e.g., Reynolds, 2006b;
Sonenshein, 2007).
While Study 2 examined a part of the EDM process thought to comprise an early
stage of it (e.g., Jones, 1991), Study 3 sought to include behavioral outcomes to test
hypotheses relating automatic and controlled cognitive processes and the later stages of
the EDM process. The pattern of results in Study 3 supports an automatic, not controlled,
account of the ethical decision and behavior process. Indeed, I observed a doubledissociative pattern of results in which an automatic cognitive element (i.e., implicit
attitude toward sexual harassment) predicted on-line sexually harassing organizational
behavior, whereas a controlled cognitive element (i.e., explicit attitude) did not. Perhaps
most importantly, I failed to observe an additive or interactive pattern involving these two
attitudes for predicting either behavior, which is quite compelling. Specifically, these
findings indicate that, not unlike arguments present in Greenwald et al.’s (2009) metaanalysis, automatic assessments (e.g., implicit attitudes) are the preferred assessment
technique when there exist conditions that foster socially-desirable responding. More
critically, these findings suggest that predictors and criteria in EDM and sexual
harassment research require revision at the revolutionary level. Indeed, if verbal
descriptions of attitudes, intentions, and behaviors regarding sexual harassment are as
potentially meaningless as verbal descriptions of culture (see Matsumoto, 2006), then not
only have past research efforts been inefficient with regard to providing increased
understanding of the phenomena at hand, but also the field may need to engage in some
massive theory rebuilding beyond that provided by additional “boxes and arrows”
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(Tenbrunsel & Smith-Crowe, 2008). It is in this spirit that the recent automatic accounts
of EDM have emerged, and the present dissertation provides support for them.
Theoretical Implications
The theoretical implications of the three studies are relatively straightforward. As
described earlier, the controlled cognition account of managerial EDM has long played a
central role in business ethics research (Sonenshein, 2007). However, this picture has
begun to change among psychologists (e.g., Haidt, 2001) and management scholars (e.g.,
Reynolds, 2006b). In addition, empirical tests of theoretical alternatives to the controlled
view have been scant. By considering the question of EDM automaticity from three
distinct paradigmatic routes, the three studies reported herein offer a wide array of
observations regarding the effects of automatic cognitive processes’ role during EDM,
and thereby allow for future theory development.
In addition, the three studies offer implications with regard to the understanding
of sexual harassment phenomena. Indeed, researchers have proposed that such behaviors
are elicited by underlying, automatic processes (e.g., Fitzgerald, 1993), and that they are
linked to the concepts of inter-individual power (Bargh et al., 1995) and aggression
(O'Leary-Kelly, Bowes-Sperry, Bates, & Lean, 2009). However, few empirical studies
have investigated this possibility. For instance, Bargh et al. (1995) found that the degree
of automatic association between the concepts power and sex, as indicated by a measure
similar to Greenwald et al.’s (1998) implicit association test, was positively related to
scores on Pryor’s (1987) likelihood to sexually harass scale. From participant memory
performance, Pryor and Stoller (1994) inferred a similar association between the concepts
dominance and control and sexuality. These data indicate that self-reported behavioral
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intention to sexually harass and nonconscious cognitive processes are linked. However,
there currently exist no data to support that nonconscious measures predict beyond selfreported behavioral intention (e.g., on-line behaviors). By providing a test of these
propositions, sexual harassment researchers will be better able to build theory and
thereby explain the phenomenon of sexual harassment in organizations.
Practical Implications
The results of this dissertation offer several implications for the practice of HR
management. Specifically, two primary implications concern (1) ethics training program
design and assessment, and (2) organizational culture assessment. For instance,
Trevino’s (1986) person-situation interactionist model of managerial EDM asserts that
facets of organizational culture moderate the link between ethical cognitions and
(un)ethical behavior. Street et al. (2001) likewise assert that situational characteristics
(e.g., personal accountability) influence the level of cognitive effort elicited by an ethical
scenario.
Ethics Training
Regarding managerial ethics training, while its application plays an increasingly
central role in universities and organizations, some researchers consider the area
controversial (e.g., Reynolds, 2006b) or the practice a wasted effort (e.g., McKenzie &
Machan, 2003). Indeed, a recent meta-analysis on business ethics instruction (Waples,
Antes, Murphy, Connelly, & Mumford, 2009) revealed little convincing evidence for its
effectiveness. Reasons for the ineffectiveness of ethics instruction may lie in its content,
delivery technique, chosen measures of effectiveness, or underlying assumptions. For
instance, if the long-standing assumption regarding the link between moral reasoning and
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moral behavior is not entirely accurate, as the present results indicate, then training
efforts aimed solely at modifying moral reasoning (cf. Waples et al., 2009) may be prone
to failure. This may especially be the case if automatic cognitive processes influence the
EDM process, or if managers lack the cognitive resources required of such reasoning
processes at the time the decision is made (cf. Chugh, 2004; Sonenshein, 2007; Street et
al., 2001). Under either of these conditions, it would be ideal for individuals to have
undergone ethics training aimed at influencing the tendency to automatically behave in a
manner compatible with organizational values, as is common to military and medical
training (Seligman & Kahana, 2009). As such, HR managers should consider training
techniques that include automatic cognitive process modification components.
Reynolds (2006b) stressed that ethical decisions preceded by automatic cognitive
processes require distinct training curricula. According to Reynolds (2006b), training of
automatic behavioral antecedents may be accomplished through programs targeted at (a)
modification of existing prototypes, (b) reinforcement of existing prototypes, and (c)
development of new prototypes for emergent ethical issues (e.g., electronic privacy).
Regarding the first goal, Seligman and Kahana (2009) proposed that simulations may be
applied with repeated spanned trials, as seen in flight simulations. In contrast to
traditional classroom or online instruction, managerial simulations may offer increased
ecological validity by placing the learner in the role of decision-maker while receiving
feedback. In addition, simulations providing participants with exposure to many variants
of a particular ethical dilemma (e.g., varied types of sexual harassment) will foster the
development, maintenance, and modification of a given prototype. To reflect on an
earlier example, a prototype represents a cognitive schema. Just as viewing many
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exemplars of dog species will facilitate the automatic judgment of a newly encountered
species (i.e., as “a dog”), so too should repeated (simulated) encounters with varied
instances of organizational sexual harassment facilitate the automatic judgment of such
behavior. This contrasts with traditional techniques that rely on controlled cognition that
focus on reasoning through the classification of given ethical criteria (e.g., Was the sexual
behavior unwanted – yes or no?). According to Reynolds (2006b), related techniques
include interactive group discussion and role playing (Gioia, 1992), both of which
facilitate the process through which controlled decision-making (i.e., C-system)
components modify the contents of the automatic system (i.e., X-system), thereby
allowing its automatic operation during future ethical issue encounters. Because the EDM
process was herein influenced by the need to justify ethical decisions, support for the
practice of group discussion is provided.
One issue that may threaten inferences regarding the effectiveness of ethical
training involves the chosen assessment criteria. Waples et al.’s (2009) meta-analysis on
ethics training provided an assessment of the moderating effect of training criteria.
Interestingly, the criterion that reveled the greatest relative impact of training was moral
reasoning, whereas the criterion associated with the lowest level of training effectiveness
was ethical behavior. While limited, these findings highlight the need to consider
alternative training techniques in managerial settings. Indeed, it remains possible that
traditional training techniques may influence only moral reasoning as it appears on
tailored post-test training assessments, which, in turn, may have a trivial influence on
ethical behavior (cf. Shao et al., 2008). At least two alternative interpretations of these
results may be advanced. First, it is possible that participants exposed to ethical training
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respond differently to criteria due to priming effects or heightened socially-desirable
responding from the training. In contrast, automatic assessment techniques including the
IAT are relatively immune to faking and socially desirable responding (Fazio & Olson,
2003). It is in this sense that automatic evaluation of ethical attitudes offers another
managerial tool: ethics training assessment. Indeed, if automatic assessments of ethical
attitudes reflect a change after training (i.e., pre-test vs. post-test), a stronger inference
regarding the effectiveness of the training may be made. In addition, demonstration of a
change in automatic cognitive processes related to ethical behavior will also increase the
likelihood that organizational members will, under the common condition of limited
cognitive resource availability, behave in manner compatible with organizational goals.
Organizational Culture
Implications for organizational culture may also be proposed. Business ethics
scholars have suggested a link between organizational culture and its members’ ethical
behavior (e.g., Douglas, Davidson, & Schwartz, 2001; Herndon, Fraedrich, & Yeh, 2001;
Nill & Schibrowsky, 2005; Singhapakdi, 1993). Reynolds (2006b) proposed that
unethical behavior may be the result of shared inappropriate prototypes, the
understanding of which may have important consequences for shaping an organization’s
ethical culture. This idea is compatible with Seligman and Kahana’s (2009) use of the
term mental model in the training context, and the idea of shared mental models in work
teams (cf. Kellermanns, Floyd, Pearson, & Spencer, 2007). For instance, over repeated
trials, compensation systems compatible with financial misconduct (cf. Hess, 2007) may
foster a shared organizational prototype for reacting to such situations in certain ways.
Over time, financial misconduct may thus become an automatic behavior – one that is not
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given reasonable consideration prior to action. However, to be sure, this is not to say that
reasoning is the panacea to prevent such actions. Rather, HR managers should seek to
maintain an organizational culture, through formal and informal structures, that reinforce
ethical behavior to a degree whereby it becomes automatic. By doing so, even under
conditions of limited cognitive resource availability, behaviors will be exhibited that
reflect an organization’s intended climate.
Sexual Harassment
Finally, the proposed studies offer several implications for research specific to
sexual harassment. As described earlier, sexual harassment phenomena have been linked
to organizational aggression (O'Leary-Kelly et al., 2009), as well as interpersonal power
(Bargh et al., 1995). If sexually harassing behavior is conducted by those who hold
prototypes indicative of an automatic powersex association (Bargh et al., 1995), and
conduct such behavior without being aware of it (Fitzgerald, 1993), then HR managers
may consider incorporating training components designed to draw to awareness the
possibility of this association. Bargh et al. (1995) referred to this practice as
“consciousness raising” (p. 779), and has noted that this practice could override the
automatic cognitive influences at play (Bargh, 1992). In addition, reflecting on the
earlier idea that new ethical issues may arise over time (e.g., electronic privacy), it seems
logical that a change in employee hierarchical status (e.g., promotion to management)
without such training could lead to deleterious effects. As such, HR managers should
consider additional awareness training programs for those being promoted to positions of
power.
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Limitations and Future Directions
Like most laboratory research, the present studies use a convenience sample of
university students, and may also lack ecological validity and external validity due to the
use of paper people. In addition, it may be tempting to conjecture that the assessments
employed across the three studies lack face validity and organizational relevance.
However, the results of Study 3 highlight the possibility that researchers’ focus on a
particular technique (e.g., questionnaire methodology) may foster an important omission
with regard to the construct space of sexual harassment attitudes and behaviors.
Not unlike Study 3, where participants were led to believe that they were
electronically chatting with another individual, sexual harassment and EDM researchers
should consider the use of more realistic stimulus materials, and more realistic behavioral
assessment techniques (Lengnick-Hall, 1995). This point is stressed in light of the
observed non-significant relationship between explicit behavioral reports (i.e., what
participant say they do), and online behavioral assessments (i.e., what participants
actually do).
Another limitation of the present studies relates to a stronger test of the competing
models. Specifically, sexual harassment, by its nature, is related to participant gender.
While some investigations have evaded this issue by studying only male participants
(Siebler et al., 2008), this practice limits generalizability, as well. Consequently, it is
possible that some of the inferences drawn above are related to participant gender, but not
exclusively the other predictors. However, this context choice was justified given its
existing research attention -- particularly that related to automatic cognitive process
governance (Bargh et al., 1995). Future research might consider testing the relationships
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explored in this dissertation with a gender-neutral scenario. However, provided that
several meta-analyses on EDM shave shown that females react differently to sexual
harassment ethical issues as well as issues related to general business practices (e.g.,
embezzlement), ensuring that a given scenario is gender neutral may be difficult, if not
impossible. This problem is especially the case for studies that continue to employ
explicit measures of attitudes, intentions, and behaviors.
Finally, future research might consider the efficacy of organizational ethical
training programs with consideration given to automatic assessment techniques. Indeed,
as described earlier, recent meta-analytic evidence indicates that ethical training
programs influence survey responses (e.g., behavioral intention items) about unethical
behavior. However, the training does not seem to influence the behavior itself (Waples et
al., 2009). Following this conjecture, automatic assessment techniques like the IAT
(Greenwald et al., 1998) and its derivatives may provide a more accurate picture of
attitudes before and following training. Importantly, future research should examine
automatic and controlled processes (e.g., attitudes) and on-line as well as self-reported
behavior. Indeed, several scholars maintain that explicit and implicit attitudes are
beneficial to many research areas, as their inclusion affords tests of the varied possible
relationship patterns (cf. Perugini, 2005) among themselves as well as downstream
behavioral phenomena.
Conclusion
Results of the three studies reported herein shed light on ethical decision making
about sexual harassment in organizational settings. Taken together, results of Study 1
and Study 2 provide support for automatic models of ethical decision making, especially
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the influence of moral intensity for only justifying participants (Study 1), and the
influence of issue typicality, but not moral intensity, on unobtrusive ethical issue
recognition (Study 2). In addition, results of Study 3 demonstrate that automatic, but not
controlled, cognitive processes predict sexually harassing behavior. In addition, results
of Study 2 and Study 3, through their findings of relationships with unobtrusive
attitudinal and recognition measures, cast doubt on a number of common-practice
methodological traditions in organizational EDM research. Results of Studies 1-3
demonstrate influences of automatic cognitive processes on EDM outcomes, thereby
providing support for the class of EDM models emphasizing automatic cognitive
governance.
The results of the present studies allow some inferences regarding future EDM
model modification. As described earlier, the results cast doubt on some long-held
assumptions about the EDM process, particularly the role ascribed to moral intensity.
While no single model can explain the array of results described in the present
dissertation, Reynolds’s (2006) automatic model of ethical decision making is most
consistent with the findings reported herein. What, then, may constitute fruitful future
treatments of the EDM process? First, the present results indicate that the need to justify
ethical decision outcomes acts as a necessary prerequisite to the allocation of cognitive
effort. Future models may consider justification need as a ‘first step’ in stage models,
where appropriate. Second, although no interaction of automatic and controlled cognitive
processes in predicting ethical behavior was observed in Study 3, future views may
consider explicitly modeling this interaction, or allow for predictions regarding the
interaction between the two processes. Indeed, although not explicitly treated in this
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dissertation, one remaining possibility entails a differential impact of these two modes of
cognition as a function of ethical issue topical area (for a similar argument, see
Greenwald et al., 2009; Strack & Deutsch, 2004).
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Appendix A
SUBJECT CONSENT FORM FOR PARTICIPATION IN HUMAN RESEARCH
University of Memphis
PLEASE READ THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT BEFORE SIGNING AND
PARTICIPATING IN THIS RESEARCH STUDY
Project Title: Decision making in Organizational Settings and Basic Reaction Time Tasks.

You are being asked to participate in a research study investigating how people perceive and
respond to scenarios occurring in organizational settings. Obtaining this information is important
for employers and the legal system for the purpose of managing and responding to various
organizational issues. You will be asked to read several short scenarios, and make decisions
about how you would respond to these scenarios if you were to make the decision. After you
read each scenario, you will be asked to respond to a series of questions about your evaluations of
and reactions to the scenario. You will also be asked to perform some simple reaction time tasks.
The study will take 120 minutes or less to complete. There are no risks posed to you as a result of
participating in this study. Your participation is voluntary. Refusal to participate involves no
penalty or loss of benefits to which you are otherwise entitled. Discontinued participation at any
time involves no penalty or loss of benefits to which you are otherwise entitled.
Additional questions or concerns about the present study can be answered by contacting Frank
Bosco, Principal Investigator, via email (fbosco@memphis.edu) or phone (901 678-4531).
Additional questions about the rights of human subjects can be answered by contacting the
University of Memphis' Chair of the Institutional Review Board for the Protection of Human
Subjects at (901) 678-2533.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

AUTHORIZATION: I have read the above statement and understand the potential discomforts,
inconvenience, and risk of this research study. I acknowledge that I am agreeing to participate in
this research study, and that my anonymity will be protected. Before I participate, I understand
that I may refuse to participate and that I may withdraw from the research study at any time
without prejudice. I also acknowledge and agree to the stipulation that the University of
Memphis does not provide funding for injury or damages that may be imposed from this research
study.

Name (print): ________________________

Date:_____________________

Name (sign):

Time:_____________________

________________________
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Linda is an employee who works for an investment firm. Last Tuesday, Linda provided a
written complaint about Kevin, her supervisor, whose recent behavior has resulted in her
discomfort at work. According to the human resources office, Linda stated that Kevin
had told her that she would receive a favorable performance evaluation if she were to
engage in a sexual relationship with him. Linda has worked for the investment firm for
about one year, and seems to be relatively happy with her job and her other coworkers.
Kevin is a popular member of the organization, and has a record of considerable success
over the past five years. The human resources manager must now provide a decision
regarding what to do about Kevin’s behavior, and has welcomed input from the other
managers. They were told that Kevin described in explicit visual detail the sexual acts
that she would need to perform to receive favorable job performance ratings. According
to Linda’s account, Kevin’s descriptions of the sexual acts were offensive. The other
managers were also informed that Linda had complained that she was less able to
perform her job functions. [Quid pro quo sexual harassment; Typical reporting
relationship
Shandra is an employee for a home furnishings chain. Recently, she filed a complaint to
the corporate human resources manager. Shandra’s complaint was that Antoine, one of
her subordinates, told her that she would receive a favorable performance evaluation if
she were to engage in a sexual relationship with him. Shandra has worked for the chain
for over five years, and has been relatively happy with her workplace and the
compensation package. According to records held by the human resources office, a
similar complaint had been made about Antoine’s behavior in the past, but that complaint
was later resolved by the human resources staff in a way that pleased both parties. When
the human resources manager asked Shandra for the details of the incident, Shandra
explained that Antoine described in explicit visual detail the sexual acts that she would
need to perform to receive favorable job performance ratings. According to Shandra’s
account, Antoine’s descriptions of the sexual acts were offensive. Shandra said that
Antoine’s behavior made her feel uncomfortable and that Antoine’s behavior has
interfered with her ability to perform her job. [Quid pro quo sexual harassment;
Atypical reporting relationship]
Kathy is an employee at a local chain restaurant. Kathy has worked for the restaurant
chain for five years, and enjoys her work. Last week, she met with a representative of the
department of human resources to complain about another employee’s behavior. The
department of human resources takes employee complaints very seriously, and ensures
that each case brought by an employee is investigated in detail. Kathy noted that Henry,
her supervisor, made her feel very uncomfortable by repeatedly asking her out on dates
after she had clearly refused his offers, and asked him to stop this behavior. Kathy also
noted that Henry’s behavior had made it difficult for her to complete her work. The
department of human resources has also met with Henry, and has collected details
regarding his version of the events. Henry has a good record of performance with the
restaurant, and also enjoys his work. At this point, the department must make a decision
regarding how to address Henry’s behavior. According to human resources, there are
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several possible outcomes to this case.[Hostile environment sexual harassment;
Typical reporting relationship]
Latoya has worked for a local electronics company for seven years. She currently works
full-time, is pleased with the benefits she receives, and enjoys the field very much. Three
days ago, Latoya complained that Jerome, one of her subordinates, made her feel very
uncomfortable by repeatedly asking her out on dates after she had clearly refused his
offers, and asked him to stop this behavior. Jerome also described specific sexual
behaviors that the two could engage in. Latoya made a complaint to her human resources
manager and described the details of Jerome’s behavior. Latoya noted that his behavior
made her feel very uncomfortable, interfered with her work, and made her think about
leaving the organization. The department of human resources is currently investigating
Latoya’s claim, and will soon come to a decision regarding what to do about Jerome’s
behavior. Jerome is not aware of the ongoing investigation. In addition, Jerome is one of
the organization’s most successful sales representatives, and also very much enjoys
working for this electronics company. [Hostile environment sexual harassment;
Atypical reporting relationship]
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Recommended personnel action
Instructions: Suppose that you have been asked to give advice on the situation. Below
are items that assess how you would respond to the complaint. Please indicate the extent
to which you think each response is appropriate by typing the number from the scale
below. Use the following scale for your responses:
1 = Not Appropriate; 4 = Moderately Appropriate; 7 = Very Appropriate
Do nothing about [target]'s sexual harassment complaint.
Suggest to [target] that she is making a big deal out of a minor incident and it will be best
if she just lets it go.
Encourage [target] to drop the issue.
Verbally reprimand [perpetrator].
Give [perpetrator] a written reprimand in his personnel file.
Suspend [perpetrator] for one work day without pay.
Suspend [perpetrator] for three work days without pay.
Transfer [perpetrator] to another part of the organization.
Terminate [perpetrator].
Personally provide [target] with social support and sympathy.
Personally provide [perpetrator] with social support and sympathy.
Provide [target] with company-funded counseling.
Provide [perpetrator] with company-funded counseling.
Justification
In a few complete sentences, please provide a justification for your decision based on the
responses you just made (respond to the question below). (Press the "1" key once you
have completed your response.)
The human resources manager has suggested that he be terminated; other managers have
suggested that he should continue employment, but first undergo counseling. WHAT
WOULD YOU DO, AND WHY?
Manipulation check: Moral Intensity
Instructions: Please use the scale below to answer the following question. Do you
believe any harm resulting from the depicted action will be…
1 = Minor; 7 = Severe
Please indicate the degree to which you believe society as a whole considers the depicted
action…
1 = Unethical; 7 = Ethical
Jones (1991) Stage: Ethical Intention (I)
If you were [perpetrator], please rate the likelihood that you would engage in the action in
the scenario
1 = Definitely would not; 7 = Definitely would
1 = Improbable; 7 = Probable
1 = Impossible; 7 = Possible
1 = Unlikely; 7 = Likely
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Jones (1991) Stage: Ethical Issue Recognition
The situation involves an ethical problem
This incident has nothing to do with ethics
1 = Strongly Disagree; 4 = Neither agree nor disagree; 7 = Strongly Agree
Jones (1991) Stage: Ethical Judgment
[perp]'s behavior is harmful
[perp]'s behavior has the potential to cause harm
[perp]'s behavior is unethical
[perp]'s behavior is immoral
1 = Strongly Disagree; 4 = Neither agree nor disagree; 7 = Strongly Agree
Jones (1991) Stage: Ethical Intention (II)
I would pretend that I did not witness the incident
I would ask [target] to clarify or explain the incident
I would ask [perp] to clarify or explain the incident
I would provide emotional support to [target]
I would report the incident to someone in a higher position
I would call an anonymous ethics hotline to report the incident
I would testify as a witness during an investigation of the incident
I would ask [perp] to refrain from such behavior
1 = Strongly Disagree; 4 = Neither agree nor disagree; 7 = Strongly Agree
Manipulation Check: Issue Typicality
Instructions: Please use the scale below to answer the following question.
In this example, a male SUPERVISOR was accused of harassing a female
SUBORDINATE. How common do you think this event is in the workplace (i.e., how
frequently do you think this occurs in the real world)?
1 = Very rare; 7 = Very common
In this example, a male SUPERVISOR was accused of harassing a female
SUBORDINATE. How often have you heard of, or witnessed, this occurring in the
workplace?
1 = Never; 7 = On a regular basis
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Practice trials

Experimental trials

Stimulus

Condition

Stimulus

Condition

bend
tail
noble
cabin
civic
utopia
select
hurried
circuit
arrival
heating
leather
category
criminal
probable
charming
workshop
diffusion
sentiment
imitation
Silg
Porv
Brout
sholn
skodd
trysed
viesed
noagues
yeegged
klurtes
cwauved
chirche
threekks
skwailts
scrorcks
staughte
quoodged
scroaphed
skwyndged
shoatched

Neutral word
Neutral word
Neutral word
Neutral word
Neutral word
Neutral word
Neutral word
Neutral word
Neutral word
Neutral word
Neutral word
Neutral word
Neutral word
Neutral word
Neutral word
Neutral word
Neutral word
Neutral word
Neutral word
Neutral word
Nonword
Nonword
Nonword
Nonword
Nonword
Nonword
Nonword
Nonword
Nonword
Nonword
Nonword
Nonword
Nonword
Nonword
Nonword
Nonword
Nonword
Nonword
Nonword
Nonword

wrong
sin
legal
righteous
justice
bad
illegal
dishonest
values
good
due
wet
make
forward
deposit
modern
upper
piece
cardboard
hibernate
plurchsony
troin
zook
feev
jinliny
absangy
juz
fud
bif
throarled
utsraults
prolmed
tilms
gadmat
nonfortul
kolmed
slont
bundley
vaw
siplo

Ethics-related word
Ethics-related word
Ethics-related word
Ethics-related word
Ethics-related word
Ethics-related word
Ethics-related word
Ethics-related word
Ethics-related word
Ethics-related word
Neutral word
Neutral word
Neutral word
Neutral word
Neutral word
Neutral word
Neutral word
Neutral word
Neutral word
Neutral word
Nonword
Nonword
Nonword
Nonword
Nonword
Nonword
Nonword
Nonword
Nonword
Nonword
Nonword
Nonword
Nonword
Nonword
Nonword
Nonword
Nonword
Nonword
Nonword
Nonword
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INSTRUCTIONS: Please read each joke, then rate each in terms of its funniness and
potential to harass a female. When rating the joke's funniness, please consider how funny
you personally find the joke (1 = Not at all funny; 5 = Very funny). When rating the
joke's harassment potential, assume that the joke recipient is a (male/female) who is
relatively sensitive to gender issues (1 = Not at all harassing; 5= Very harassing).
Neutral jokes (all participants)
Q: What do you get if you cross the Godfather with a philosopher? A: An offer you can’t
understand.
Q: What do fish say when they hit a concrete wall? A: Dam.
Q: What’s the difference between a lawyer and a snake? A: Drivers will swerve to avoid
a snake.
Q: What lies at the bottom of the ocean and twitches? A: A nervous wreck.
Q: Why didn’t the chicken cross the road? A: Because he was too chicken.
Q: You were in Egypt and didn't even see The Pyramids? A: I didn't know they were
performing there.
Q: What's the difference between a hamster and a cow? A: Cows survive the branding.
Q: How are politicians like baby diapers? A: Because they should be changed often, and
for the same reasons.
Q: How do you identify a bald eagle? A: All of his feathers are combed to one side.
Q: Name five animals that live in Africa. A: Three elephants and two giraffes.
Q: How do you catch a squirrel? A: Climb into a tree and act like a nut.
Q: What did the ocean say to the beach? A: Nothing, It just waved.
Q: What do you call a sleeping cow? A: A bulldozer.
Q: How do crazy people go through the forest? A: They take the psycho path.
Q: Why are frogs so happy? A: They eat whatever bugs them.
Q: How can you tell a politician is not lying to you? A: He is riding in the back of a
hearse.
Q: If I am holding 5 apples in one hand and 4 apples in the other, then what do I have? A:
Incredibly large hands.
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Jokes offensive to females (male participants only)
Q: Why do women have smaller feet than men? A: It's one of those "evolutionary things"
that allows them to stand closer to the kitchen sink.
Q: How do you know that a blonde was working in an office? A: There is white-out on
the computer screen.
Q: How do you get a redhead to argue with you? A: Say something.
Q: Why don't women wear watches? A: There's a clock on the stove.
Q: When will women go to the moon? A: When it needs to be cleaned up.
Q: What did Batman say to Robin before they got in the car? A: Robin, get in the car.
Q: How many men does it take to open a beer? A: None. It should be opened by the time
she brings it.
Q: How do you know when a woman is about to say something smart? A: When she
starts a sentence with, "A man once told me..."
Q: What is worse than a male chauvinist pig? A: A woman who does not want to obey.
Q: Why do blondes walk in circles in the shower? A: Because the label on the shampoo
bottle reads: Wash and Go.

Jokes offensive to males (female participants only)
Q: Why did God make man before woman? A: You need a rough draft before you have a
final copy.
Q: What do you do with a man who thinks he is God's gift to women? A: Exchange him.
Q: How many honest intelligent, caring men in the world does it take to do the dishes? A:
Both of them.
Q: Why were men given larger brains than dogs? A: So they wouldn’t hump women’s'
legs at cocktail parties.
Q: What is the difference between a man and a shopping cart? A: A shopping cart has a
mind of its own.
Q: How do men sort out their laundry? A: Filthy, and filthy but wearable.
Q: What is a man's idea of helping out with housework? A: Lifting his leg so you can
vacuum.
Q: Why is psychoanalysis quicker for men than for women? A: When it's time to go back
to his childhood, he's already there.
Q: How are men like noodles? A: They're always in hot water, they lack taste, and they
need dough.
Q: What's the difference between men and government bonds? A: Government bonds
mature.
Q: How many men does it take to change a roll of toilet paper? A: We don’t know - it’s
never happened.
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(Jokes for male participants)
Q: How are politicians like baby diapers? A: Because they should be changed often, and
for the same reasons.
OR
Q: Why don't women need an umbrella? A: Because it doesn't rain between the kitchen
and the bedroom.
Q: How can you tell a politician is not lying to you? A: He is riding in the back of a
hearse
OR
Q: What is a skeleton in the closet? A blonde that won at hide-and-seek.
Q: How do you identify a bald eagle? A: All of his feathers are combed to one side.
OR
Q: How do you get a redhead to argue with you? A: Say something.
Q: What did the ocean say to the beach? A: Nothing, It just waved.
OR
Q: How do you know that a blonde was working in an office? A: There is white-out on
the computer screen.
Q: What do fish say when they hit a concrete wall? A: Dam.
OR
Q: Why do women have smaller feet than men? A: It's one of those "evolutionary things"
that allows them to stand closer to the kitchen sink.
Q: What do you get from a pampered cow? A: Spoiled milk.
OR
Q: Why don't women wear watches? A: There's a clock on the stove.
Q: What do you hear when you hold a gyro close to your ear? A: The silence of the
lambs.
OR
Q: Why do blondes walk in circles in the shower? A: Because the label on the shampoo
bottle reads: Wash and Go.
Q: What’s the difference between a lawyer and a snake? A: Drivers will swerve to avoid
a snake.
OR
Q: How many men does it take to open a beer? A: None. It should be opened by the time
she brings it.
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(Jokes for female participants)
Q: What do you hear when you hold a gyro close to your ear? A: The silence of the
lambs.
OR
Q: How are men like noodles? A: They're always in hot water, they lack taste, and they
need dough.
Q: How do you identify a bald eagle? A: All of his feathers are combed to one side.
OR
Q: How many honest intelligent, caring men in the world does it take to do the dishes? A:
Both of them.
Q: What do you get from a pampered cow? A: Spoiled milk.
OR
Q: What is a man's idea of helping out with housework? A: Lifting his leg so you can
vacuum.
Q: What did the ocean say to the beach? A: Nothing, It just waved.
OR
Q: How many men does it take to change a roll of toilet paper? A: We don’t know - it’s
never happened.
Q: How can you tell a politician is not lying to you? A: He is riding in the back of a
hearse.
OR
Q: What is the difference between a man and a shopping cart? A: A shopping cart has a
mind of its own.
Q: What do fish say when they hit a concrete wall? A: Dam.
OR
Q: Why is psychoanalysis quicker for men than for women? A: When it's time to go back
to his childhood, he's already there.
Q: What’s the difference between a lawyer and a snake? A: Drivers will swerve to avoid
a snake.
OR
Q: Why were men given larger brains than dogs? A: So they wouldn’t hump womens'
legs at cocktail parties.
Q: How are politicians like baby diapers? A: Because they should be changed often, and
for the same reasons.
OR
Q: What's the difference between men and government bonds? A: Government bonds
mature.
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Appendix H
(Images for male participants)
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(Images for female participants)
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Positive (i.e., “I like”) words
beautiful
celebrating
cheerful
excellent
excitement
fabulous
friendly
glad
glee
happy
laughing
likable
loving
marvelous
paradise
pleasure
smiling
splendid
superb
triumph
wonderful

Negative (i.e., “I don’t like”) words
angry
brutal
destroy
dirty
disaster
disgusting
dislike
evil
gross
horrible
humiliate
nasty
noxious
painful
revolting
sickening
terrible
tragic
ugly
unpleasant
yucky
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(Items for explicit attitude toward sexual harassment: Male participants)
1 = Strongly Disagree; 4 = Neither agree nor disagree; 7 = Strongly Agree
An attractive woman has to expect sexual advances and should learn how to handle them
Most men are sexually teased by many of the women with whom they interact on the job
or at school
Most women who are sexually insulted by a man provoke his behavior by the way they
talk, act, or dress
A man must learn to understand that a woman’s “no” to his sexual advances really means
“no”
It is only natural for a woman to use her sexuality as a way of getting ahead in school or
at work
An attractive man has to expect sexual advances and should learn how to handle them
I believe that sexual intimidation is a serious social problem
It is only natural for a man to make sexual advances to a woman he finds attractive
Innocent flirtations make the workday or school day interesting
Encouraging a professor’s or a supervisor’s sexual interest is frequently used by women
to get better grades or to improve their work situations
One of the problems with sexual harassment is that some women can’t take a joke
The notion that what a professor does in class may be sexual harassment is taking the
idea of sexual harassment too far
Many charges of sexual harassment are frivolous and vindictive
A lot of what people call sexual harassment is just normal flirtation between men and
women
Sexual assault and sexual harassment are two completely different things
Sexual harassment refers to those incidents of unwanted sexual attention that aren’t too
serious
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Sexual harassment has little to do with power
Sexism and sexual harassment are two completely different things
All this concern about sexual harassment makes it harder for men and women to have
normal relationships
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(Items for explicit attitude toward sexual harassment: Female participants)
1 = Strongly Disagree; 4 = Neither agree nor disagree; 7 = Strongly Agree
An attractive woman has to expect sexual advances and should learn how to handle them
Most women are sexually teased by many of the men with whom they interact on the job
or at school
Most men who are sexually insulted by a woman provoke her behavior by the way they
talk, act, or dress
A woman must learn to understand that a man’s “no” to his sexual advances really means
“no”
It is only natural for a man to use his sexuality as a way of getting ahead in school or at
work
An attractive man has to expect sexual advances and should learn how to handle them
I believe that sexual intimidation is a serious social problem
It is only natural for a woman to make sexual advances to a man she finds attractive
Innocent flirtations make the workday or school day interesting
Encouraging a professor’s or a supervisor’s sexual interest is frequently used by men to
get better grades or to improve their work situations
One of the problems with sexual harassment is that some men can’t take a joke
The notion that what a professor does in class may be sexual harassment is taking the
idea of sexual harassment too far
Many charges of sexual harassment are frivolous and vindictive
A lot of what people call sexual harassment is just normal flirtation between men and
women
Sexual assault and sexual harassment are two completely different things
Sexual harassment refers to those incidents of unwanted sexual attention that aren’t too
serious
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Sexual harassment has little to do with power
Sexism and sexual harassment are two completely different things
All this concern about sexual harassment makes it harder for men and women to have
normal relationships
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(Items for self-reported sexually harassing behavior)
1 = Never; 2 = Once or twice; 3 = Sometimes; 4 = Often; 5 = Most of the time
In your work experience, have you ever been in a situation where you yourself implied
faster promotions or better treatment if someone were sexually cooperative?
In your work experience, have you ever been in a situation where you yourself made
unwanted attempts to establish a romantic sexual relationship with someone despite their
efforts to discourage it?
In your work experience, have you ever been in a situation where you yourself made
someone feel threatened with some sort of retaliation for not being sexually cooperative?
In your work experience, have you ever been in a situation where you yourself touched
someone in a way that made them feel uncomfortable?
In your work experience, have you ever been in a situation where you yourself made
offensive remarks about someone’s appearance, body, or sexual activities?
In your work experience, have you ever been in a situation where you yourself made
offensive sexist remarks?
In your work experience, have you ever been in a situation where you yourself treated
someone “differently” because of their sex?
In your work experience, have you ever been in a situation where you yourself made
unwelcome attempts to draw someone into a discussion of sexual matters?
In your work experience, have you ever been in a situation where you yourself treated
someone badly for refusing to have sex?
In your work experience, have you ever been in a situation where you yourself sexually
harassed someone?
In your work experience, have you ever been in a situation where you yourself made
someone feel like they were being bribed with a reward to engage in sexual behavior?
In your work experience, have you ever been in a situation where you yourself displayed,
used, or distributed sexist or suggestive materials?
In your work experience, have you ever been in a situation where you yourself put
someone down or was condescending to someone because of their sex?
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In your work experience, have you ever been in a situation where you yourself made
unwanted attempts to stroke, fondle, or kiss someone?
In your work experience, have you ever been in a situation where you yourself continued
to ask someone for dates, drinks, dinner, etc., even though they said “No”?
In your work experience, have you ever been in a situation where you yourself made
gestures or used body language of a sexual nature which embarrassed or offended
someone?
In your work experience, have you ever been in a situation where you yourself repeatedly
told sexual stories or jokes that were offensive to someone?
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